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ZIVOTOFSKY II AND NATIONAL SECURITY  
DECISIONMAKING AT THE LOWEST EBB 
CHASE HARRINGTON† 
ABSTRACT 
  This Note examines assertions of exclusive presidential power in 
light of the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Zivotofsky ex rel. 
Zivotofsky v. Kerry. This Note argues that, contrary to the suggestion 
of some commentators, the decision enhances the President’s ability to 
disregard legislative restrictions at flashpoints of national security 
decisionmaking. 
  As Zivotofsky II saw, the President exclusively holds the power to 
recognize foreign countries. More significant, however, are the analytic 
moves that the Court introduces when assessing a President’s defiance 
of an act of Congress—a setup where the President’s power reaches its 
“lowest ebb.”  
  The Zivotofsky II Court reshaped the lowest-ebb posture by relying 
heavily on historical practice and functionalist arguments to support its 
conclusion that the President enjoys exclusive authority over foreign 
recognition. Such arguments have never before been invoked by the 
Court to invalidate an act of Congress in the field of foreign affairs and 
systematically favor the executive in future separation-of-powers 
standoffs. Moreover, even if courts read Zivotofsky II narrowly, 
executive branch lawyers will not. And because justiciability doctrines 
often insulate executive action from judicial review, the primary (if not 
the only) legal assessment of hard national security choices will be 
made by lawyers in the executive branch. 
  To illustrate the importance of Zivotofsky II’s impact on executive 
power, this Note presents three case studies in areas where the political 
branches have ambiguous or overlapping authority and where the 
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structural advantages of the executive branch are uniquely important—
covert actions, electronic surveillance, and the disposition of captured 
enemy combatants. 
INTRODUCTION 
Article II’s Take Care Clause obliges the President to enforce 
(and not violate) the Constitution and laws that Congress enacts.1 In 
the rare instance where a federal statute subtracts from the authority 
that the Constitution commits exclusively to the executive branch, the 
President’s duty is to abide by the Constitution and disregard the 
statute.2 
Section 214(d) of the 2003 Foreign Relations Authorization Act 
(FRAA) was apparently such a statute.3 That provision directed the 
secretary of state to record, upon request, the birthplace of a 
Jerusalem-born U.S. citizen as “Israel.”4 One month after section 
214(d) was enacted, Menachem Binyamin Zivotofsky was born to U.S. 
citizens living in Jerusalem.5 His parents, believing that Jerusalem 
belongs to Israel, requested the State Department record their son’s 
birthplace as “Jerusalem, Israel.”6 They were refused.7 As the 
Department saw things, section 214(d) unconstitutionally interfered 
with the President’s power to recognize the sovereign boundaries of 
foreign states.8 In response, the Zivotofskys sued the secretary of state, 
asking the court to enforce section 214(d) and order the Department 
to include “Israel” on their son’s passport and consular report of birth 
abroad.9 
Over the ensuing twelve years, the Zivotofskys’ suit produced two 
significant Supreme Court decisions. The first, Zivotofsky ex rel. 
 
 1. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 4 (“[H]e shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed . . . .”). 
 2. For instance, Congress probably cannot punish someone for receiving a presidential 
pardon. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147 (1872) (invalidating a statute 
requiring courts to deprive southern landowners, pardoned by President Lincoln, from the 
proceeds of their confiscated property). 
 3. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-228, § 214(d), 
116 Stat. 1350, 1366 (2002) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1765d-1(d) (2012)), invalidated by Zivotofsky 
ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2083 (2015) (Zivotofsky II). 
 4. Id.  
 5. Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State, 571 F.3d 1227, 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. at 2083. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
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Zivotofsky v. Clinton (Zivotofsky I),10 decided that the political 
question doctrine did not bar the judiciary from deciding whether 
section 214(d) was constitutional.11 Three years later, in Zivotofsky ex 
rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II),12 the Court held that the 
President holds an exclusive power to recognize foreign states and that 
section 214(d) placed an unconstitutional limitation on this recognition 
power.13  
Zivotofsky II was the first time that the Supreme Court sustained 
a President’s disregard of a federal statute in the field of foreign 
relations.14 The familiar framework for assessing such questions of 
presidential power is Justice Robert Jackson’s concurring opinion in 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,15 a case in which the Supreme 
Court invalidated President Harry Truman’s seizure of steel mills 
during the Korean War.16 Justice Jackson’s concurrence, which 
subsequent cases have followed,17 grouped executive power into three 
categories: the President’s power is (1) “at its maximum” when acting 
with the “authorization of Congress”; (2) “uncertain . . . in absence of 
either a congressional grant or denial of authority”; and (3) at its 
“lowest ebb” when in direct defiance of Congress.18  
The federal judiciary, however, is not the only expositor of law on 
presidential power. Administration lawyers constantly advise the 
President about the limits of executive authority, although they 
operate under an institutional incentive to find reasonable grounds to 
support the President’s objectives.19 Justice Jackson’s legal career 
 
 10. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189 (2012) (Zivotofsky I). 
 11. Id. at 191. 
 12. Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015). 
 13. Id. at 2083. 
 14. See id. at 2113 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Today’s decision is a first: Never before has 
this Court accepted a President’s direct defiance of an Act of Congress in the field of foreign 
affairs.”). 
 15. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 592 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
 16. Id. at 589. 
 17. See, e.g., Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 524 (2008) (describing Justice Jackson’s 
“familiar tripartite scheme” from Youngstown as “the accepted framework for evaluating 
executive action”); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668–69 (1981) (stating that the Court 
“in the past [has] found and do[es] today find Justice Jackson’s classification of executive actions 
into three general categories analytically useful”). 
 18. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635–37 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 19. See Neal Devins & Michael Herz, The Battle that Never Was: Congress, the White House, 
and Agency Litigation Authority, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 205, 219 (1998) (explaining that 
“DOJ attorneys may well see the President as their client,” not necessarily “the United States 
HARRINGTON IN PRINTER FINAL - REVISED (DO NOT DELETE) 12/1/2018  9:18 AM 
1602  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:1599 
illustrates this point. While serving as attorney general (a little over a 
decade before Youngstown), Jackson famously defended President 
Franklin Roosevelt’s decision to trade American destroyers to Great 
Britain in exchange for the right to establish military bases in the West 
Indies and Canada.20 Roosevelt’s destroyers-for-bases deal likely 
violated laws enacted by Congress to keep America neutral in World 
War II.21 In his formal opinion defending the legality of the deal, 
Jackson invoked functionalist arguments about the President’s role in 
foreign affairs to justify stretching these statutes up to—if not past—
their breaking point.22 
That backdrop sheds light on the opening sentence of Justice 
Jackson’s concurring opinion in Youngstown. As one “who has served 
as legal adviser to a President in time of transition and public anxiety,” 
Jackson intimately understood both the “practical advantages and 
grave dangers” of plenary presidential powers in foreign affairs.23 
During Jackson’s subsequent service on the Court, he took a different 
view of the “practical advantages” offered by comprehensive executive 
power that he had once praised as attorney general.24 Jackson’s career 
illustrates that institutional objectives inform the interpretation and 
 
writ large”); Randolph D. Moss, Executive Branch Legal Interpretation: A Perspective from the 
Office of Legal Counsel, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1303, 1304 (2000) (“In the process of executing the 
laws, the executive branch is perpetually involved in giving the law meaning.”).  
 20. Acquisition of Naval and Air Bases in Exchange for Over-Age Destroyers, 39 Op. Att’y 
Gen. 484, 486–87 (1940) [hereinafter Destroyers Opinion]. President Roosevelt candidly 
remarked to the Canadian Prime Minister that if the transaction’s “legal problems” were not 
resolved, General Jackson’s “head will have to fall.” See William R. Casto, Attorney General 
Robert Jackson’s Brief Encounter with the Notion of Preclusive Presidential Power, 30 PACE L. 
REV. 364, 365–66 (2010) (quoting Memorandum of Conversation with Prime Minister Mackenzie 
King (Aug. 22, 1940), in 46 JAY PIERREPONT MOFFAT, DIPLOMATIC PAPERS (on file with 
Harvard College Library)).  
 21. See, e.g., Act of July 19, 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-757, § 7, 54 Stat. 779, 780 (prohibiting 
disposal of any “vessel, ship, or boat” belonging to the U.S. Navy); An Act to Expedite National 
Defense, and for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 76-671, § 14, 54 Stat. 676, 681 (1940) (repealed 
1990) (instructing that “no . . . naval weapon, ship, boat, aircraft, munitions, supplies, or 
equipment . . . shall hereafter be transferred”).  
 22. See Edwin Borchard, The Attorney General’s Opinion on the Exchange of Destroyers for 
Naval Bases, 34 AM. J. INT’L L. 690, 690 (1940) (“[T]he transaction was sustained under statutes 
which hardly bear the construction placed upon them.”); Herbert W. Briggs, Neglected Aspects of 
the Destroyer Deal, 34 AM. J. INT’L L. 569, 886 (1940) (“The ‘meaning’ which Attorney General 
Jackson appears to regard as the sole purpose of Sec. 2 [of the statute] . . . is in reality a reading 
that Sec. 2 countenances a violation of international law.”).  
 23. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 24. Id.  
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application of precedent.25 For Justice Jackson, reliance on presidential 
powers at their “lowest ebb” was the “least favorable of possible 
constitutional postures.”26 
Though the lowest-ebb posture traditionally demands an explicit 
textual basis in the Constitution,27 the Zivotofsky II Court invalidated 
section 214(d) by invoking an executive power that appears nowhere 
in the language of Article II. Instead, the Court held that the relevant 
power rests on the President’s time-honored practice of recognizing 
foreign states and certain “functional considerations”: that the 
recognition act should be made by a single branch of government; the 
President has better access to diplomatic intelligence; and the unitary 
executive is positioned better than the plural Congress to act with 
“[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch.”28 Yet, Youngstown stands 
for the principle that when the executive branch takes action that 
conflicts explicitly or implicitly with federal law, the President’s 
authority relies on his Article II powers minus the enumerated powers 
of Congress.29 Zivotofsky II reorients that understanding by invoking 
historical practice and functional advantages as additional 
justifications for its conclusion that the President’s recognition power 
is exclusive. 
The implications of Zivotofsky II for separation-of-powers 
disputes have received little academic discussion in their relation to the 
national security arena. Professor Jack Goldsmith has argued that 
Zivotofsky II will strengthen presidential authority in general but has 
only briefly addressed the decision’s significance in the military and 
 
 25. Chief Justice John Roberts made this point at his confirmation hearing when questioned 
about his own record of aggressively defending presidential power at the Department of Justice 
(DOJ). See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice 
of the United States, Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 153 (2005) (statement of 
John G. Roberts, Jr., Judge, D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals) (“[Jackson] recognized, when he 
became a member of the Supreme Court, that his job had changed . . . [and] he was not the chief 
lawyer in the executive branch, he was a justice sitting in review of some of the decisions of the 
Executive.”); see also Jack Goldsmith, Zivotofsky II as Precedent in the Executive Branch, 129 
HARV. L. REV. 112, 115 (2015) (“The impact of a Supreme Court decision depends very much on 
the institution that interprets and applies it.”). 
 26. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 640 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 27. Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 485 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(stating that the President only prevails over an act of Congress in instances “where the 
Constitution by explicit text commits the power at issue to the exclusive control of the President”). 
 28. Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2086 (2015) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 424 
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). 
 29. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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intelligence contexts.30 Other scholars have written that Zivotofsky II 
is a narrow win for the President in the short term, but may enhance 
the power of Congress to conduct foreign relations in the long term.31 
Professor Michael Glennon, for instance, has suggested that Zivotofsky 
II will strengthen the War Powers Resolution (WPR) and could have 
bolstered congressional challenges to the Obama administration’s 
executive agreement with Iran.32 “[B]eyond the narrow confines of 
recognition,” Glennon concludes, “nothing in Zivotofsky [II] makes a 
future presidential victory more likely.”33 
A better understanding of Zivotofsky II, derived from examining 
the functionalist analysis that the Court used to assess claims of 
exclusive executive power, shows that these scholars overreach. This 
Note argues that Zivotofsky II portends a shift away from the 
presumption that Congress wins direct confrontations with the 
President in matters of constitutional ambiguity regarding executive 
power.34 Instead, Zivotofsky II inverts this presumption by invoking 
the historical practices and structural advantages of the executive 
branch.35 That reasoning sweeps past the narrow issue of recognition 
authority and may embolden the President to meet the exigencies of 
modern security threats with greater assertions of exclusive war 
powers.36 
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I reviews the law of 
presidential power as a matter of theory. Part II unpacks Zivotofsky II 
as it relates to assertions of exclusive executive power. Part II.A argues 
that the decision reshapes the lowest-ebb category in Justice Jackson’s 
Youngstown framework, and Part II.B predicts that Zivotofsky II will 
be applied aggressively within the executive branch.  
 
 30. Goldsmith, supra note 25, at 142. 
 31. See, e.g., Michael Dorf, Zivotofsky May Be Remembered as Limiting Exclusive 
Presidential Power, DORF ON LAW (June 8, 2015, 12:52 PM), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/
2015/06/zivotofsky-may-be-remembered-as.html [https://perma.cc/C772-2X8F] (arguing that 
Zivotofsky II “may be remembered over the long term as a limit on exclusive presidential 
power”); Michael J. Glennon, Recognizable Power: The Supreme Court Deals a Blow to Executive 
Authority, FOREIGN AFF. (June 23, 2015) https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-
states/2015-06-23/recognizable-power [https:// perma.cc/DY6B-9Y46] (stating that Zivotofsky II 
“may actually have enhanced [Congress’s] power”). 
 32. Glennon, supra note 31. 
 33. Id. 
 34. For further discussion, see infra notes 77–83 and accompanying text. 
 35. For further discussion, see infra notes 111–44 and accompanying text. 
 36. For further discussion, see infra Part III and accompanying notes. 
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Against that background, Part III presents three case studies—
concerning covert actions, electronic surveillance, and the treatment of 
captured enemy combatants—to illustrate how Zivotofsky II will 
concretely enhance presidential power at flashpoints of national 
security decisionmaking. Part IV answers objections, particularly from 
the recent scholarship interpreting Zivotofsky II as a “win” for 
Congress.  
I.  WHY CONGRESS (ALMOST) ALWAYS WINS: THE YOUNGSTOWN 
FRAMEWORK 
The Supreme Court has long mediated the relationship between 
Congress and the President in the field of foreign affairs. Two prior 
decisions, Little v. Barreme37 and United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export 
Corp.,38 represent competing views of the balance of foreign affairs 
power between the political branches.39 The former, emphasizing the 
Constitution’s text, enjoined the President to execute Congress’s 
foreign policy unless the statute squarely encroached on an Article II 
power. The latter, emphasizing the law of nations, historical practice, 
and necessity, concluded that the President had the dominant role in 
driving foreign affairs. In his Youngstown concurrence, Justice Jackson 
melded portions of each decision to create a taxonomy of presidential 
foreign affairs powers. Examining Youngstown vis-à-vis Little and 
Curtiss-Wright situates the legal posture of the executive branch when 
it acts against Congress in foreign affairs.  
A. Dueling Conceptions of Executive Foreign Affairs Power 
Little addressed the scope of President John Adams’s 
Commander-in-Chief powers by using standard formalist tools: the 
Constitution’s text and structure. Little, authored by Chief Justice John 
Marshall at the height of the (undeclared) Quasi-War with France, held 
that the President lacked independent power to commence hostilities 
against vessels engaged in “illicit commerce” with French merchants.40 
At issue was the President’s construction of the Non-Intercourse Act, 
a law that authorized the Navy to seize American vessels “commencing 
 
 37. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804). 
 38. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
 39. See generally Michael J. Glennon, Two Views of Presidential Foreign Affairs Power: 
Little v. Barreme or Curtiss-Wright?, 13 YALE J. INT’L L. 5 (1988) (comparing the two cases). 
 40. Little, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 177. 
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. . . to any French port.”41 Recognizing that “if only vessels sailing to a 
French port could be seized on the high seas . . . the law would be very 
often evaded,”42 the Navy secretary gave the law a broader 
construction, charging naval officers to seize ships “bound to or from 
French ports.”43 Following that order, the American frigate USS 
Boston, commanded by Captain Little, seized the brigantine Flying 
Fish as it was returning from France.44 The owners of the Flying Fish 
sued Little for damages. The Court acknowledged that the President’s 
order was “much better calculated to give [the embargo] effect.”45 
Nevertheless, the Court held that President Adams’s pragmatism could 
not be squared with the plain meaning of the statute and ordered Little 
to pay damages.46 
Little exemplifies a formalist understanding of executive 
authority. In a direct confrontation between Congress’s power to 
“make Rules concerning Captures”47 on the high seas and the 
President’s responsibility to protect the nation as “Commander in 
Chief,”48 Little makes clear that the “will of Congress controls.”49 
Critically, Chief Justice Marshall reached that conclusion unswayed by 
the functional advantages of the President’s order. Little rejects the 
idea that the President’s power can expand to the point of lawmaking 
during hostilities with foreign actors. 
Curtiss-Wright articulated a different vision of presidential power. 
In Curtiss-Wright, the Supreme Court held that a joint resolution 
authorizing President Roosevelt to prohibit weapon sales to Bolivia 
and Paraguay during the Chaco War was not an unconstitutional 
delegation of legislative authority.50 The opinion’s legacy lies in Justice 
George Sutherland’s dictum that the President possesses the “plenary 
and exclusive” power to conduct foreign relations.51 This power flows 
partly from the reality that the President has better intelligence than 
Congress, and conducting “transactions with foreign nations” often 
 
 41. Non-Intercourse Act, ch. 2, § 1, 1 Stat. 613, 614 (1799) (expired 1800) (emphasis added). 
 42. Little, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 178. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 176. 
 45. Id. at 178. 
 46. Id. at 178–79. 
 47. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 11. 
 48. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 49. Glennon, supra note 39, at 10 (emphasis omitted). 
 50. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 329 (1936). 
 51. Id. at 320. 
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“requires caution” and “unity of design . . . secrecy and dispatch.”52 But 
Justice Sutherland located the primary source of executive power in his 
conception of “external sovereignty.”53 Under that view, foreign affairs 
powers were not conferred solely by the Constitution, but had 
instead—at the moment the colonies secured independence from 
Great Britain—“passed from the Crown” directly to the Union, not to 
the individual states.54 
Scholars have long criticized Curtiss-Wright’s theory that the 
President possesses all of King George III’s international powers and, 
particularly, the Court’s penultimate characterization of the President 
as “the sole organ of the nation in its external relations.”55 Justice 
Sutherland drew that statement from an address delivered by then-
Congressman John Marshall, who was later the author of the Court’s 
opinion in Little.56 Marshall’s speech concerned the case of Jonathan 
Robbins, an American charged with committing murder aboard a 
British frigate.57 President Adams had made the controversial decision 
to extradite Robbins to England for trial, as required by the Jay 
Treaty.58 Marshall defended President Adams, insisting that he had 
done no more than “execute” the Jay Treaty, as was “the duty of the 
Executive department.”59 Far from casting the executive as the sole 
organ of American foreign policy, Marshall instead argued that the 
President was solely responsible for enforcing it.60 That is why four 
years later, as Chief Justice, Marshall did not resolve Little by 
 
 52. Id. at 319 (quoting S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 14TH CONG., REP. ON 
RELATIONS WITH GREAT BRITAIN (Feb. 15, 1816) (report authored by Senator William Wyatt 
Bibb of Georgia), IN 6 COMPILATION OF REPORTS OF COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 
UNITED STATES SENATE, 1789–1901: DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH FOREIGN NATIONS–
HAWAIIAN ISLANDS 19, 21 (1901)).  
 53. Id. at 318. 
 54. Id. at 316. 
 55. Id. at 319 (quoting 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800) (statement of Rep. John Marshall)); 
see, e.g., Julius Goebel, Jr., Constitutional History and Constitutional Law, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 
555, 572 n.46 (1938) (calling Curtiss-Wright a “perversion”); C. Perry Patterson, In re the United 
States v. the Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, 22 TEX. L. REV. 286, 297 (1944) (describing 
Curtiss-Wright as “(1) contrary to American history, (2) violative of our political theory, (3) 
unconstitutional, and (4) unnecessary, undemocratic, and dangerous”).  
 56. 10 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 55, at 613. 
 57. For background information on the case, see United States v. Robbins, 27 F. Cas. 825, 
826 (D.S.C. 1799). 
 58. Id.  
 59. 10 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 55, at 614. 
 60. See Louis Fisher, The Law: Presidential Inherent Power: The “Sole Organ” Doctrine, 37 
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 139, 140 (2007) (summarizing Marshall’s argument as the view that the 
President’s job was to “implement[]” foreign policy).  
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appealing to whatever power the President possesses as the “sole 
organ” of American foreign policy; he appealed, instead, to the 
President’s “high duty . . . to ‘take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed.’”61 
To summarize, the Court had decided separation-of-powers 
disputes prior to Youngstown in two divergent ways. The first, 
represented by Little, drew upon the Constitution’s text and structure, 
particularly the President’s affirmative duty to enforce federal law. The 
second, represented by Curtiss-Wright, emphasized the functional 
advantages of the executive, with the result being that the President 
must have “freedom from statutory restriction” if the “success for our 
aims” in foreign affairs is to be achieved.62 These views were 
synthesized in Youngstown.  
B. The Youngstown Framework  
Youngstown did not wash away Little and Curtiss-Wright from the 
palimpsest of separations-of-powers jurisprudence. Instead, it made 
explicit the principle that when both Congress and the President share 
powers, the President’s ability to brush off a federal statute is narrowly 
limited.  
At the height of the Korean War, President Truman issued 
Executive Order No. 10,340, directing the Secretary of Commerce to 
seize most American steel mills to avoid a strike by the United 
Steelworkers of America.63 President Truman feared a halt in steel 
production would “immediately jeopardize and imperil our national 
defense” and “add to the continuing danger of our soldiers” in Korea.64 
The secretary of commerce immediately designated the heads of the 
steel companies as “operating managers for the United States,” and 
directed them to maintain uninterrupted production of steel.65 These 
orders were begrudgingly obeyed, but the steel companies went to 
court and challenged President Truman’s authority to nationalize the 
steel industry.66 Executive branch lawyers defended the order as a 
 
 61. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 177 (1804) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3). 
 62. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936). 
 63. Exec. Order No. 10,340, 17 Fed. Reg. 3139, 3141 (Apr. 8, 1952). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 583. 
 66. Id. 
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lawful exercise of the President’s “inherent” Article II powers, which 
had “accrued” from the actions of “preceding administrations.”67 
On a six-to-three vote, the Supreme Court invalidated Truman’s 
order in Youngstown.68 Justice Hugo Black, writing for the Court, 
readily dispatched the Truman administration’s argument that former 
Presidents had lawfully seized private businesses to resolve labor 
disputes “without congressional authority.”69 He maintained that the 
President’s inherent authority came only from “express constitutional 
language”;70 acquired powers must come from “an act of Congress.”71  
Justice Felix Frankfurter concurred. He suggested that 
congressional acquiescence to “unbroken, executive practice” could 
lawfully “be treated as a gloss on ‘executive Power.’”72 But he ruled 
against Truman’s order because there was no evidence of such 
acquiescence to a presidential seizure power.73 
Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion, drawing from Black’s 
formalism and Frankfurter’s historical-gloss arguments, laid out the 
now-canonical framework for evaluating presidential power. He began 
with the Constitution’s structure: by design, the Constitution “enjoins 
upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but 
reciprocity.”74 Yet that system of checks is not evenly balanced since 
the strength of presidential powers “depend[s] upon their disjunction 
or conjunction with . . . Congress.”75 In other words, there is a 
rebuttable presumption that the President must carry out federal 
legislation and may only override laws that subtract from core 
executive powers.76 
Justice Jackson conceptualized the “Congress wins” presumption 
as a continuum punctuated by three categories.77 When either 
implicitly or explicitly backed by Congress (Category One), 
presidential powers are at their apex because the President wields “all 
 
 67. Id. at 646 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 68. Id. at 589 (majority opinion). 
 69. Id. at 588.  
 70. Id. at 587.  
 71. Id. at 585. 
 72. Id. at 610–11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 73. Id. at 614. 
 74. Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 75. Id. 
 76. See Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408, 441 
(2007) (describing the extent of the executive’s power as “a function of Congress’s own action”). 
 77. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635–37 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate.”78 
When Congress is silent (Category Two), the President can only invoke 
“his own independent [Article II] powers.”79 Justice Jackson did 
concede, however, that congressional acquiescence may “invite” 
presidential action.80 Finally, when the President takes an action that 
Congress has implicitly or explicitly forbidden by statute (Category 
Three), executive “power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only 
upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of 
Congress.”81 In this posture, the President may only claim “conclusive 
and preclusive” authority.82 Such assertions of power must be carefully 
“scrutinized” because “what is at stake is the equilibrium established 
by our constitutional system.”83 
Youngstown is a useful framework for unpacking separation-of-
powers disputes between the political branches in foreign affairs.84 
Congress and the President often have uncertain or overlapping 
constitutional authority to conduct foreign relations.85 In these cases, 
Youngstown instructs that Congress, wielding one of its enumerated 
powers, may impose limitations on presidential authority, save only for 
 
 78. See id. at 635 (articulating Category One as presidential action “pursuant to an express 
or implied authorization of Congress”). Justice Jackson identifies Curtiss-Wright as a Category 
One case. See id. at 635−36 n.2 (“[Curtiss-Wright] involved . . . the question of [the President’s] 
right to act under and in accord with an Act of Congress.”). 
 79. Id. at 637. 
 80. Id.; see also id. at 637 n.3 (discussing President Lincoln’s decision to suspend the writ of 
habeas corpus, later ratified by Congress (citing Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (Taney, 
Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487))). Although Justice Jackson considered Merryman 
to be a “judicial challenge” to Lincoln’s decision to suspend the writ, id., that view might not hold 
up under close scrutiny. See Seth Barrett Tillman, Ex Parte Merryman: Myth, History, and 
Scholarship, 224 MIL. L. REV. 481, 495–500 (2016) (“The first and primary Merryman myth is that 
President Lincoln ignored or defied a judicial order from Chief Justice Taney to release John 
Merryman.”). 
 81. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 82. Id. at 638. 
 83. Id.; see also id. at 638 n.4 (stating that President Roosevelt’s decision to fire a Federal 
Trade Commissioner was “contrary to the policy of Congress and impinging upon an area of 
Congressional control” (citing Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 631–32 (1935))).  
 84. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668–69 (1981) (describing “Justice Jackson’s 
classification of executive actions” as “analytically useful” in a case regarding an executive order 
suspending U.S. claims against Iran); CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW 174 (2d ed. 2006) (“Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown . . . has been 
very influential. Indeed, courts and commentators often give more weight to Jackson’s 
concurrence than to the majority opinion.”). 
 85. See Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 735 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (discussing 
the “complicated intersection” of the “Executive’s and the Legislature’s foreign affairs 
responsibilities”). 
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indefeasible executive functions such as the President’s role as the 
superintendent of the armed forces.86 Insofar as substantive 
emanations from Congress’s Article I powers and the President’s 
Article II powers conflict, Youngstown instructs that Congress should 
prevail.87 
The Court more recently affirmed that understanding in Hamdan 
v. Rumsfeld.88 There, the Court concluded that the President lacked the 
power to try Salim Ahmed Hamdan by military commission in a 
manner incongruous with the Uniform Code of Military Justice.89 
Hamdan, like Zivotofsky II, was a Category Three case. And in 
assessing the scope of the executive’s power to convene military 
commissions, the Court cited Jackson’s Youngstown framework for the 
proposition that the President “may not disregard limitations that 
Congress has, in proper exercise of its own war powers, placed on his 
powers.”90 In other words, Congress (generally) prevails over the 
Commander in Chief’s war powers at the lowest ebb. That being so, 
Congress should have even stronger basis to prevail over the President 
in decisions concerning foreign recognition, on which the 
Constitution’s text is silent. Hamdan, then, suggests that the Zivotofsky 
II Court should have focused first on whether Congress had the proper 
authority to regulate passports (and if so, uphold the statute)—not 
whether the President’s recognition power can displace 
constitutionally valid legislation.91 
Indeed, the prevailing understanding before Zivotofsky II was 
that the existence of an Article II power was not grounds to invalidate 
a duly enacted law unless “the Constitution by explicit text commits” 
that power to the sole control of the President.92 Congress can 
criminalize the torture of enemy combatants,93 though arguably that 
delimits the President’s Commander-in-Chief power. But Congress 
cannot enact laws penalizing individuals whom the President has 
pardoned, because that would vitiate the clear text of the pardon 
 
 86. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President shall be commander in chief of the 
Army and Navy of the United States.”). 
 87. For further discussion, see supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text. 
 88. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 635 (2006). 
 89. Id. at 613, 617–25. 
 90. Id. at 593 n.23. 
 91. For further discussion of congressional action, see infra notes 133–37 and accompanying 
text. 
 92. Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 485 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 93. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A (2012) (defining and criminalizing torture). 
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power.94 Tethering the source of exclusive executive power to the 
Constitution’s language corresponds with Justice Jackson’s description 
of presidential power because Category Three clearly contemplates 
that the President has exclusive powers beyond the reach of Congress.95 
The Court, however, has long resisted the idea that “undefined” 
penumbras on presidential power allow the President to defy federal 
laws.96 
Because Congress only loses in direct confrontations with the 
President in the rare cases where executive power is exclusive, the 
source of exclusive presidential power is an important and 
controversial question. The formalist view, represented by Little, 
identified the constitutional text as the only source of such exclusive 
power. The functionalist view, represented by Curtiss-Wright, placed a 
high value on effective foreign policy, and so gave the President the 
lead role in foreign affairs. The in-between approach was articulated 
by Justice Jackson in Youngstown. He conceded to the functionalists 
that the contours of authority between Congress and the President are 
not clearly defined,97 but he otherwise rested his analysis on a formalist 
view that, even in foreign relations, Congress passes laws and the 
President executes them.98 Although the distribution of power is not 
fixed, it does tilt toward Congress. The next Part examines Zivotofsky 
II’s impact on that presumption. 
 
 94. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 148 (1872) (striking down a statute 
denying southern landowners, whom President Lincoln pardoned, from the proceeds of their 
confiscated property); see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“[The President] shall have Power to 
grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of 
Impeachment.”). 
 95. According to Justice Jackson, the Commander-in-Chief Clause means “more than an 
empty title” and “undoubtedly puts the Nation’s armed forces under presidential command.” 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 641 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 96. See, e.g., id. at 634 (predicting that “comprehensive and undefined presidential powers” 
pose “grave dangers” to the “balanced power structure of our Republic”).  
 97. See id. (lamenting the lack of “useful and unambiguous” grants of authority to the 
President in the Constitution’s text); see also id. at 640 (stating that, although “the President does 
not enjoy unmentioned powers,” “the mentioned ones should” be given “latitude of 
interpretation for changing times”). 
 98. Compare id. at 637 (observing that when the President confronts Congress, “he can rely 
only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the 
matter”), with Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 177–78 (1804) (holding that the President 
may not apply “a construction much better calculated to give” effect to a law concerning 
commerce with a hostile nation, but must “carr[y] into execution” the statute as written). 
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II.  ZIVOTOFSKY II AND EXCLUSIVE PRESIDENTIAL POWER 
Zivotofsky II presented the rare instance when justiciability 
doctrines like standing did not preclude the Court from resolving 
conflict between the political branches over the distribution of foreign 
affairs power. The Court’s opinion discusses the Constitution’s text and 
structure but ultimately reinvigorates functionalism in foreign affairs 
jurisprudence.  
President Truman recognized the State of Israel eleven minutes 
after it declared independence on May 14, 1948.99 Recognition is a 
“formal acknowledgement” that a particular nation “possesses the 
qualifications for statehood.”100 Despite President Truman’s 
unambiguous support of Israel, his administration (and every 
administration afterward) declined to endorse any nation’s claim to 
sovereignty over the holy city of Jerusalem.101 The State Department’s 
policy of neutrality was memorialized in its Foreign Affairs Manual, 
which directs officials to record only “Jerusalem” and not “Israel” on 
the records of Jerusalem-born Americans.102  
President Truman recognized Israel without authorization from 
Congress, and his independent constitutional authority to do so was 
never questioned. Whether Congress could legislate otherwise was 
tested when President George W. Bush signed the 2003 FRAA into 
law.103 Section 214 of the Act, entitled “United States Policy with 
Respect to Jerusalem as the Capital of Israel,” instructed the State 
Department to allow “a United States citizen born in the city of 
Jerusalem” to request that their place of birth be “record[ed] . . . as 
 
 99. See THOMAS A. BAILEY, A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 7 (10th 
ed. 1980) (“Truman recognized Israel de facto in 1948 after a delay of eleven minutes.”); 
Statement by the President Announcing Recognition of the State of Israel, 1 PUB. PAPERS 258 
(May 14, 1948) (memorializing Israeli recognition). 
 100. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 203 
cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
 101. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 6 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1949: THE 
NEAR EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA 739 (1977) (recommending United Nations supervision 
over the administration of Jerusalem so as to maintain “the principle of internationalization”). 
Indeed, officials in the Truman administration did not attend the inaugural session of the Israeli 
Parliament which convened in Jerusalem for fear that it would signal to neighboring countries 
that the United States favored Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem. See id. 739–41 (counseling 
against sending a U.S. representative to the meeting, as it would “run contrary to the position 
which the United States has taken in support of the internationalization of Jerusalem”). 
 102. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 7 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL § 1360 app. D (2015). 
 103. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-228, 116 Stat.  
1350 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 13, 22, 42, and 50 U.S.C.). 
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Israel.”104 President Bush refused to follow section 214(d) and 
explained in a signing statement that the provision, “if construed as 
mandatory rather than advisory,” unlawfully intruded upon the 
President’s exclusive constitutional authority to determine the status 
of Jerusalem.105 
The Zivotofsky II Court affirmed President Bush’s constitutional 
override and held that section 214(d) unlawfully interfered with the 
President’s exclusive power to make recognition decisions for the 
United States.106 Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, 
acknowledged that the State Department policy violated a federal 
statute, placing the executive power at its “lowest ebb.”107 Such 
assertions of authority, the Court reiterated, rest “solely on powers the 
Constitution grants.”108 But after analyzing the original understanding 
of the Constitution’s text as well as historical practice related to 
recognition and finding these sources inconclusive, the Court turned to 
“functional considerations.”109 These pragmatic arguments do the 
heavy lifting in Zivotofsky II and upend Youngstown’s Category Three. 
As a result, Zivotofsky II may become a significant precedent, 
particularly for executive branch lawyers who will lean on the decision 
to support broad exercises of executive power. 
A. Reassessing the Justifications for Exclusive Executive Power 
Though narrower avenues were available,110 the Court opted for a 
broad holding that the Constitution bars Congress from playing any 
role in the formal act of recognition.111 That conclusion rested on two 
premises. First, the Constitution’s text and structure, as well as 
 
 104. Id. § 214, 116 Stat. at 1365. 
 105. Statement on Signing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, 2 PUB. 
PAPERS 1697, 1698 (Sept. 30, 2003). 
 106. Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2095 (2015). 
 107. Id. at 2084 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring)).  
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 2086. 
 110. For instance, holding that Congress may not compel the President to contradict his own 
diplomatic speech. See Marty Lederman, Thoughts on Zivotofsky, Part Five: Why Did the 
Majority Choose to Decide Whether the President’s “Recognition” Power Is Exclusive?, JUST 
SECURITY (June 13, 2015, 8:26 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/23825/thoughts-zivotofsky-
part-five-majority-choose-decide-presidents-recognition-power-exclusive [https://perma.cc/J84Y
-2469] (“[T]he Court could have held that Congress at a minimum cannot compel the President 
to contradict himself when engaged in diplomatic activity.”).  
 111. Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. at 2087.  
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historical practice, vest the President with an independent recognition 
power.112 Second, “functional considerations” place the recognition 
power in the sole control of the President, and the weight of historical 
practice suggests that Congress has acquiesced to an exclusive 
executive recognition power.113  
The majority began its discussion of the recognition power by 
acknowledging that the State Department policy violated a federal 
statute, placing the executive’s power at its “lowest ebb.”114 Such 
assertions of authority, the Court reiterated, can rest “solely on powers 
the Constitution grants.”115 The Court identified three potential 
sources of an executive power to control recognition determinations. 
The first, the Reception Clause, obliges the President to “receive 
Ambassadors and other public Ministers.”116 Drawing from Founding-
era international law scholars including Emer de Vattel, Joseph Chitty, 
and Hugo Grotius, the Court concluded that reception accomplished 
recognition because receiving an ambassador signified that the sending 
nation was a legitimate sovereign.117 Indeed, though at the ratification 
debates Alexander Hamilton described the Reception Clause as “more 
a matter of dignity than authority,” he changed his view after President 
Washington recognized the revolutionary French government by 
receiving Ambassador Genêt.118 As the Court noted, after this event, 
 
 112. Both parties and all nine Justices accepted that the President has the independent power 
to recognize a foreign state. See Brief for the Petitioner at 17–18, Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. 
Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2014) (No. 13-628) (arguing that the President’s recognition power is not 
exclusive, but not contesting that it exists); Brief for the Respondent at 9–12, Zivotofsky ex rel. 
Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2014) (No. 13-628) (arguing that the President’s recognition 
power is exclusive); see also Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. at 2111 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (placing the President’s recognition power “among the foreign affairs powers 
vested in the President by Article II’s Vesting Clause”); id. at 2114 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) 
(accepting that “the President has authority over recognition”); id. at 2118 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(agreeing “that the Constitution empowers the President to extend recognition on behalf of the 
United States”). 
 113. See Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. at 2086 (reasoning that because “the text and structure of 
the Constitution grant the President the power to recognize foreign nations . . . [t]he question 
then becomes whether that power is exclusive”); see also id. at 2118 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting 
that the “much harder question” is whether the Constitution gives the President the exclusive 
power of recognition).  
 114. Id. at 2084 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring)).  
 115. Id.  
 116. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 117. See Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. at 2085 (collecting sources). 
 118. Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, at 420 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961)).  
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Hamilton would write that receiving an ambassador necessarily 
entailed substantive judgments about “whether the new rulers are 
competent organs of the national will, and ought to be recognized.”119 
In addition, the Court cited the power of the President to “make 
Treaties” and “appoint Ambassadors” with the “Advice and Consent 
of the Senate” as additional textual support of an Article II recognition 
power.120  
Alone, these enumerated powers support an independent basis for 
presidential authority over recognition; they do not resolve whether 
the Constitution makes the recognition power exclusive in the sense 
that the President can preclude Congress from making a different 
determination.121 To answer the exclusivity question, the Court claimed 
that only the President could unilaterally recognize a foreign nation, 
either by receiving their ambassador or by initiating a treaty. This first-
mover advantage signaled that the power was not just independent, but 
also exclusive. 
To support that inference, the Court pivoted to “functional 
considerations.”122 First, recognizing a foreign nation necessitates that 
the United States “speak . . . with one voice.”123 That voice should be 
the President’s alone so that recognition decisions can be durable and 
unambiguous.124 Foreign actors rely on such determinations when 
conducting diplomatic or commercial relations with the United States. 
For instance, countries must be able to trust that their ambassadors will 
be received, that their diplomats will have legal immunity, and that 
American courts will be open to them so that they can protect their 
interests.125 Moreover, the President is better equipped to 
 
 119. Id. (quoting Alexander Hamilton, No. 1 (Pacificus), in THE LETTERS OF PACIFICUS AND 
HELVIDIUS ON THE PROCLAMATION OF NEUTRALITY OF 1793, at 5, 13–14 (1845)). 
 120. See id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2). 
 121. Joseph Story, cited by the majority, understood the President’s power to receive an 
ambassador as including a recognition power, but he also thought it was possible that Congress 
could reverse a President’s recognition determination. See 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1560, at 416–17 (1833) (describing diplomatic 
recognition as “an acknowledgement of the sovereign authority de facto of such new nation or 
party” but leaving “open to discussion” the question of whether Congress could make recognition 
decisions on its own). 
 122. Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. at 2086. 
 123. Id. (quoting Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 424 (2003)). 
 124. Id. Or, in some circumstances, the President may in fact wish to take a position of 
“strategic ambiguity.” See KERRY B. DUMBAUGH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IB98034, TAIWAN: 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND U.S. POLICY CHOICES (2006) (characterizing the United States 
foreign policy towards Taiwan as one of “strategic ambiguity”). 
 125. Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. at 2086. 
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communicate with the “secret diplomatic contacts” that may lead to a 
recognition decision. In sum, only the unitary executive (not the plural 
Congress) possesses the indispensable attributes of “[d]ecision, 
activity, secrecy, and dispatch.”126  
The Court then assessed the historical practice of recognition 
decisions.127 Though “history is not all on one side,” the Court found 
that Congress “acquiesced” to complete presidential control of 
recognition.128 As examples, the Court noted that Congress refused to 
recognize the postcolonial governments of Buenos Aires and Chile 
partly because it viewed recognition as “an exercise of Executive 
authority.”129 Additionally, after allegations that Spain had sunk the 
USS Maine in Havana Harbor during Cuba’s rebellion in 1898, 
Congress sought to recognize the insurgent Cuban government. 
President William McKinley objected, believing that such recognition 
was premature under the law of nations.130 Instead of recognizing “the 
Republic of Cuba,” Congress passed a joint resolution that called for 
“the recognition of the independence of the people of Cuba.”131 
Drawing from these and similar episodes, the Zivotofsky II Court 
concluded that Congress had not claimed a concurrent recognition 
power but rather had deferred to the President’s judgment.132 
Zivotofsky II changes the methodology for assessing presidential 
powers at the lowest ebb. To begin with, Zivotofsky II ends its analysis 
where Justice Jackson would begin—namely, with the powers of 
 
 126. Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, supra note 28, at 424 (alteration in original)). 
 127. The importance of “historical gloss” on separation-of-powers cases (and especially with 
presidential power) is often attributed to Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence in Youngstown. 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 593 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
Justice Frankfurter believed “[i]t is an inadmissibly narrow conception of American constitutional 
law to confine it to the words of the Constitution and to disregard the gloss which life has written 
upon them.” Id. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). He also believed that “a systematic, 
unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before 
questioned . . . may be treated as a gloss on [the] ‘executive Power.’” Id. at 610–11. More recently, 
in NLRB v. Noel Canning, the Supreme Court gave what it called “significant weight” to the 
historical practice of the President’s recess-appointments power. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. 
Ct. 2550, 2559 (2014) (emphasis omitted). 
 128. Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. at 2091. 
 129. Id. at 2092 (citing 32 ANNALS OF CONG. 1570 (1818) (statement of Rep. Alexander 
Smyth)). 
 130. Id. at 2093. 
 131. Joint Resolution of Apr. 20, 1898, ch. 24, 30 Stat. 738 (“For the recognition of the 
independence of the people of Cuba . . . .”); see also Goldsmith, supra note 25, at 119 (observing 
that “the Court ignored a fourth potential method of recognition—namely, by statute”).  
 132. Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. at 2093–94. 
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Congress. Justice Jackson’s tripartite framework presented the 
strength of presidential powers as dependent upon “their disjunction 
or conjunction with [the powers] of Congress,” not the other way 
around.133 Yet, the majority opinion jumps to the issue of whether the 
President’s recognition power is exclusive before addressing whether 
Congress could recognize a foreign nation as an exercise of its own 
powers to regulate foreign commerce, establish uniform rules of 
naturalization, or enforce the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of 
equal citizenship to persons born abroad to American parents (and 
pass such legislation as would be necessary and proper to those 
ends).134 If recognition could be accomplished by statute under one of 
these powers, theoretically Congress could have enacted it unilaterally, 
that is, over the President’s veto.135 Thus, the Court’s chief textual 
argument for placing recognition under the sole control of the 
President—the supposed necessity that each method of recognizing a 
foreign nation requires presidential cooperation136—seems to beg an 
important question.137 
 
 133. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635, 637–38 (1952). 
 134. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 3, 4, 17 (conferring power “[t]o regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations,” “[t]o establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization,” and “[t]o make all Laws 
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all 
other Powers vested by this Constitution in [Congress]”); id. amend. XIV, § 5 (conferring power 
“to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article,” including the guarantee that 
“[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States”). And these are just the powers relevant to section 214(d). Other 
Article I powers may affect (or at least implicate) a recognition decision. See, e.g., id. art. I, § 8, 
cl. 1 (conferring power “[t]o lay . . . Duties, Imposts and Excises”); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 2 (conferring 
power “[t]o borrow Money on the credit of the United States”); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 5 (conferring 
power “[t]o coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin”); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 
(conferring power “[t]o declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules 
concerning Captures on Land and Water”). 
 135. See Marty Lederman, Thoughts on Zivotofsky, Part Six: Why the Majority’s Surprising 
Decision on Executive Exclusivity Is Unpersuasive, JUST SECURITY (June 13, 2015,  
11:39 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/23835/thoughts-zivotofsky-part-six-majoritys-surprising-
decision-executive-exclusivity-unpersuasive [http://perma.cc/NQN7-WWPG] (commenting that 
the decision may have the impact of shifting some of Congress’s foreign relations powers to the 
President). 
 136. Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. at 2086 (claiming that Congress “has no constitutional power 
that would enable it to initiate diplomatic relations with a foreign nation”). 
 137. By contrast, Justice Thomas’s opinion focused on Congress’s enumerated powers and 
concluded that section 214(d) is lawful with respect to consular reports, but not with respect to 
passports because the latter belongs to the residual executive power. Id. at 2101–10 (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia also focused on Congress’s enumerated 
powers and would have upheld section 214(d) with respect to both passports and consular reports. 
Id. at 2117, 2123–24 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For further discussion of Justice Thomas’s concurring 
opinion, see infra note 267. 
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The Court’s brief and inconclusive discussion of the Constitution’s 
language is remarkable. In a prior opinion, Justice Kennedy argued 
that the President could only prevail over an act of Congress “where 
the Constitution by explicit text commits the power at issue to the 
exclusive control of the President.”138 Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the 
Court in Zivotofsky II does not come close to that demanding standard. 
Instead, he appeals to the structural advantages and historical practice 
of the executive branch as a basis to hold that a penumbral presidential 
power displaces a federal statute. Although history is theoretically 
relevant to whether a presidential power is exclusive or concurrent, it 
had never before been successfully invoked by the executive branch as 
a constitutional basis for power at the lowest ebb.139 After all, 
Youngstown considered—and rejected—the contention that the 
President’s past acts, coupled with congressional acquiescence, 
established exclusive executive power.140  
Despite bringing historical-practice analysis into separation-of-
powers doctrine, NLRB v. Noel Canning141 does not indicate otherwise. 
In Noel Canning, the Court gave “significant weight” to historical 
practice and concluded that the President’s recess appointments power 
applied to “intra-session” recesses of the Senate.142 But under Justice 
Jackson’s framework, Noel Canning was a Category Two case because 
the President’s actions were made “in absence of either a congressional 
grant or denial of authority.”143 In that context, historical-gloss 
arguments are consistent with Youngstown because, as Jackson noted, 
congressional silence may “invite” presidential action.144  
 
 138. Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 485 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(emphasis added). 
 139. See Curtis A. Bradley, Agora: Reflections on Zivotofsky v. Kerry: Historical Gloss, the 
Recognition Power, and Judicial Review, 109 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 2, 6 (2015), https://www.
asil.org/sites/default/files/print.bradley.pdf [https://perma.cc/7NBA-JPGM] (commenting on the 
role of history in Zivotofsky II and earlier cases).  
 140. The Court explained:  
It is said that other Presidents without congressional authority have taken possession 
of private business enterprises in order to settle labor disputes. But even if this be true, 
Congress has not thereby lost its exclusive constitutional authority to make laws 
necessary and proper to carry out the powers vested by the Constitution “in the 
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.” 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588–89 (1952). 
 141. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014). 
 142. Id. at 2556, 2559.  
 143. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 144. See id. at 637 (acknowledging that, in certain cases, congressional “indifference or 
quiescence . . . enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility”). For 
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It is different, however, to cite historical gloss as a basis sustain an 
exclusive presidential power that disables Congress from legislating on 
the subject.145 In Category Two cases, historical-gloss arguments treat 
Congress’s silence as waiver. Congressional inaction suggests that it 
does not view the President’s exercise of independent powers as a 
threat to its own institutional prerogatives. But historical-gloss 
arguments in Category Three cases justify a President’s disregard of a 
statute as if it were adverse possession: what starts as a violation of law 
can, if open and notorious for a certain length of time, lawfully expand 
the power of the executive branch. 
In all events, the historical practice was “not all on one side” and 
could have been read to interpret the President’s recognition power as 
concurrent rather than exclusive.146 The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) 
is a compelling example.147 Enacted after President Carter withdrew 
recognition of the Republic of China (ROC) located on Taiwan, the 
TRA directed that Taiwan must be treated under U.S. law as if it were 
still recognized.148 And if there was any doubt as to whether Congress 
deemed the ROC to be a legitimate, sovereign power, the TRA 
mandated that Congress provide Taiwan with military resources “to 
maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.”149 True, the TRA did not 
formally recognize Taiwan, but neither did section 214(d).150 So it is 
unclear why a statute providing military armaments to Taiwan for self-
defense is consistent with official neutrality and the President’s 
decision to withhold recognition, but a law granting Jerusalem-born 
Americans the option to designate Israel as their place of birth 
interferes with the recognition power. 
 
further discussion of congressional acquiescence inviting presidential action, see supra note 80 
and accompanying text. 
 145. For further discussion, see supra note 140. 
 146. Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2091 (2015). Cf. Robert J. Reinstein, Is the President’s 
Recognition Power Exclusive?, 86 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 43–44 (2013) (collecting examples of 
congressional actions that, like section 214(d), implicate recognition determinations). 
 147. Taiwan Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 96-8, 93 Stat. 14 (1979) (codified as amended at 22 
U.S.C. §§ 3301–3316 (2012)). 
 148. See 22 U.S.C. § 3303(a) (“The absence of diplomatic relations or recognition shall not 
affect the application of the laws of the United States [which] shall apply with respect to Taiwan 
in the manner that the laws of the United States applied with respect to Taiwan prior to January 
1, 1979.”). 
 149. Id. § 3302(a), (b); see also Reinstein, supra note 146, at 43–44 (arguing that the TRA was 
tantamount to recognizing Taiwan). 
 150. Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. at 2095 (conceding that section 214(d) does “not itself constitute 
a formal act of recognition”). 
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Because the historical gloss on the President’s recognition power 
is unclear, let alone “systematic” and “unbroken,” Zivotofsky II can be 
read to place considerable weight on functionalist arguments. Unlike 
historical practice, these do point unequivocally to placing the 
recognition power solely within the executive branch. But they also 
prove too much.  
For starters, the “one voice” doctrine had never before been 
invoked to resolve a dispute between coequal branches of the federal 
government. Rather, the importance of having “one voice” speak for 
the nation was a reason why the President could preempt state law. In 
American Insurance Association v. Garamendi,151 for instance, the 
Court struck down a California statute that required in-state insurance 
companies to publish information regarding any insurance policy they 
or an affiliate sold in Europe during the Holocaust.152 The Court held 
that the statute was preempted because it “interfere[d] with the 
President’s ability to conduct the nation’s foreign policy” and 
“compromise[d] the very capacity of the President to speak for the 
Nation with one voice.”153  
The practical necessity of having a consistent foreign policy makes 
sense as a basis to preempt state law. But there is no reason why the 
abstract need for consistency must allow one branch of the federal 
government to preempt another coequal branch, nor is it obvious that 
the voice must belong to the President and not to Congress. The core 
of Zivotofsky II, ultimately, seems to be that “only the Executive has 
the characteristic of unity at all times.”154 This argument allows the 
executive to “take the decisive, unequivocal action necessary to 
recognize other states.”155 Decisiveness, in turn, allows foreign 
countries to develop stable expectations when dealing with the United 
States.156 But if the reliance interests of American allies shifts the 
distribution of unmentioned powers toward the executive, then 
Youngstown’s Category Three is hardly a presumption in favor of 
Congress.  
 
 151. Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003). 
 152. Id. at 401. 
 153. Id. at 424 (citing Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 381 (2000)). 
 154. Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. at 2086 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 70, supra note 28, at 424). 
 155. Id. 
 156. See id. (“Foreign countries need to know, before entering into diplomatic relations or 
commerce with the United States, whether their ambassadors will be received; whether their 
officials will be immune from suit in federal court; and whether they may initiate lawsuits here to 
vindicate their rights. These assurances cannot be equivocal.”). 
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To take a stark example, President Nixon vetoed the WPR 
because limiting his unilateral authority to send troops abroad would 
diminish the confidence of allies. Under the WPR, American 
involvement in foreign conflict terminates after sixty days unless the 
President obtains specific legislative authorization.157 President Nixon 
argued that the automatic deadline provision would undermine the 
confidence of our allies and embolden our enemies because “[u]ntil the 
Congress suspended the deadline, there would be at least a chance of 
United States withdrawal and an adversary would be tempted 
therefore to postpone serious negotiations until the sixty days were 
up.”158 Zivotofsky II vindicates Nixon’s argument. If the President’s 
implied recognition power can displace federal law to protect 
diplomatic confidence, then the President’s enumerated Commander-
in-Chief power should be beyond the restrictions of the WPR. This is 
particularly true when the President deems that compliance might 
“increas[e] the likelihood of miscalculation and war.”159 
Youngstown did not view the allocation of power between the 
political branches as a function of what branch would use that power 
effectively.160 Although Zivotofsky II does not support the proposition 
that a presidential power can displace federal legislation any time 
synchronicity or speed is important, it allows the executive branch’s 
structural advantages to be among the factors that the Court looks to 
when reviewing executive activity at the lowest ebb. In close calls like 
Zivotofsky II, that analytic approach helps the President because a 
unitary President will always outperform a plural legislature.161 
B. Zivotofsky II as Executive Branch Precedent 
Even if federal courts read Zivotofsky II narrowly, executive 
branch lawyers will not. Executive branch lawyers work under 
different incentives and with different materials than federal judges.162 
 
 157. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548 (2012). 
 158. Veto of the War Powers Resolution, 311 PUB. PAPERS 893, 894 (Oct. 24, 1973). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Indeed, Jackson warned against conflating “the issue of a power’s validity with the cause 
it is invoked to promote.” Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 161. See Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. at 2123 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (predicting that the 
“[f]unctionalism of the sort the Court practices today will systematically favor the unitary 
President over the plural Congress”). 
 162. See Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1448, 1456, 1458 (2010) (“[A]s an office within the Executive Branch, OLC views the law 
through a particular lens . . . . [That position] gives [OLC] a special reason to grant added weight 
to its precedents on issues of executive power.”). 
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The institutional norm of the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) is to find 
reasonable legal grounds in support of the President, often resulting in 
broad pronouncements of executive power.163 That inclination is not 
inappropriate, but simply an outworking of the Madisonian paradigm 
in which each branch of the federal government guards the metes and 
bounds of its authority against encroachments by the other two.164 
Administration lawyers are therefore careful not to concede ground to 
Congress when there is colorable basis to assert executive authority. 
Attention to the context of OLC is critical because justiciability 
doctrines like Article III standing often prevent courts from addressing 
foreign affairs questions like the use of military force.165 And even in 
the rare cases that properly present separation-of-powers questions, 
courts extend great deference to the executive and leave such issues to 
be resolved internally.166 Additionally, OLC’s memorialized opinions 
command a measure of stare decisis.167 That matters because OLC has 
 
 163. See, e.g., Memorandum of Law of the United States Department of Justice, as Amicus 
Curiae with respect to the Independent Counsel’s Opposition to the Defendant’s Motions to 
Dismiss or Limit Count One at 6, United States v. North, 708 F. Supp. 375 (D.D.C. 1988) (No. 88-
0080-02) (defending Oliver North during the Iran-Contra prosecution). 
 164. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 320–21 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(arguing that “the preservation of liberty” requires that the branches of government should, “by 
their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places”); The 
Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President and Congress, 20 Op. O.L.C. 124, 126 
(1996) (“Executive branch lawyers . . . have a constitutional obligation . . . to assert and maintain 
the legitimate powers and privileges of the President against inadvertent or intentional 
congressional intrusion.”).  
 165. Moss, supra note 19, at 1304 (observing that “standing, mootness, ripeness, or other rules 
of non-justiciability” often foreclose judicial review of Executive decisions to “commit troops 
overseas” or “assert executive privilege”). 
 166. See, e.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 563, 565 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (dismissing the 
suit of a man who alleged that he was falsely detained and tortured because “it is for the Executive 
in the first instance to decide how to implement extraordinary rendition, and for the elected 
members of Congress—and not for us as judges—to decide whether an individual may seek 
compensation”). 
 167. See Memorandum from David J. Barron, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal 
Counsel, Dep’t of Justice, to Attorneys of the Office, Re: Best Practices for OLC Legal Advice 
and Written Opinions 2 (July 16, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/
2010/08/26/olc-legal-advice-opinions.pdf [https://perma.cc/A7CV-5TL7] (“OLC opinions should 
consider and ordinarily give great weight to any relevant past opinions of Attorneys General and 
the Office. The Office should not lightly depart from such past decisions, particularly where they 
directly address and decide a point in question . . . .”); Harold Hongju Koh, Protecting the Office 
of Legal Counsel from Itself, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 513, 516 (1993) (“OLC has adopted a rule 
suggesting that past precedent should be accorded a certain measure of stare decisis from 
administration to administration.”); Morrison, supra note 162, at 1496 (“OLC’s precedents can 
function for OLC like settled Executive Branch practice functioned for Justice Frankfurter in the 
Steel Seizure case: as a ‘gloss’ on constitutional provisions that are both textually spare and under-
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also devoted extensive thought to matters of presidential power and 
national security.168 
Zivotofsky II’s expansive reading of the executive diplomacy 
power can readily be applied to national security questions.169 The 
Department of Justice (DOJ) has often argued that the President’s 
power as Commander in Chief is interwoven with the executive’s role 
as the nation’s representative to other countries.170 In 1898, acting 
Attorney General John K. Richards told President McKinley that he 
could lawfully prohibit the operation of French telegraph cables 
installed in Cape Cod without government approval.171 Richards 
concluded that the President was empowered to intervene because the 
“preservation of our territorial integrity” and “relations with foreign 
powers” are “[e]ntrusted, in the first instance, to the President.”172 
More recently, OLC defended the 2011 military intervention in Libya 
as a lawful exercise of President Obama’s “authority to conduct the 
foreign relations.”173  
Yet, the executive branch did not claim power to violate a federal 
law in either of these examples. The Foreign Cables opinion expressly 
qualified President McKinley’s power “to control the landing of 
 
addressed by judicial doctrine.”); see also id. at 1464 (“OLC’s legal advice is treated as binding 
within the Executive Branch until withdrawn or overruled.”). 
 168. Walter Dellinger’s opinion defending President Clinton’s military intervention in Haiti 
is a good example. See generally Deployment of United States Armed Forces into Haiti, 18 Op. 
O.L.C. 173 (1994) [hereinafter Haiti Opinion] (laying out the legal justifications for the 
deployment of forces to Haiti). The Haiti Opinion drew criticism from members of the legal 
academy because Dellinger, while he was a professor at Duke Law School, had maintained that 
the Persian Gulf War required prior congressional approval. See Laurence Tribe, Where Mr. 
Dellinger Stands and Where He Sits, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1994, at A16 (accusing Dellinger of 
hypocrisy). In response, Mr. Dellinger argued that “unlike an academic lawyer . . . lawyers who 
are now at the Office of Legal Counsel . . . are expected to look to the previous opinions of the 
Attorneys General” to arrive at consistent decisions. Walter Dellinger, After the Cold War: 
Presidential Power and the Use of Military Force, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 107, 109–10 (1995). 
 169. As the Supreme Court explained in a different case involving presidential power over 
passports, “foreign policy and national security considerations cannot neatly be 
compartmentalized.” Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981). 
 170. Placing of United States Armed Forces Under United Nations Operational or Tactical 
Control, 20 Op. O.L.C. 182, 183–86 (1996) (concluding that a bill prohibiting the President from 
committing U.S. troops to U.N.-commanded peacekeeping missions would “unconstitutionally 
constrain[] the President’s exercise of his constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief . . . 
[and] undermine[] the President’s constitutional authority with respect to the conduct of 
diplomacy”).  
 171. Foreign Cables, 22 Op. Att’y Gen. 13, 27 (1898). 
 172. Id. at 25–26. 
 173. Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C., 2011 WL 1459998, at *9–10 
(2011).  
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foreign submarine cables” on the “absence of a legislative 
enactment.”174 That is why Zivotofsky II will be a significant precedent 
in the executive branch. The Court not only resolved a question of 
presidential power at the lowest ebb by invoking values such as 
“unity,” the nation speaking with “one voice,” and the ability to act 
with “decision, activity, secrecy and dispatch”—it relied on such 
considerations to invalidate an act of Congress.175 
Zivotofsky II also endorses the once-controversial practice of 
presidential signing statements.176 Presidents use signing statements to 
lay down markers on provisions in a statute that they assert implicate 
an exclusive domain of the executive branch.177 Signing statements 
signal flashpoints where the President is likely to challenge Congress. 
Presidents have asserted in signing statements the exclusive power to 
initiate covert operations,178 collect electronic surveillance,179 and 
dispose of captured enemy combatants.180 
III.  ZIVOTOFSKY II AS WAR POWERS PRECEDENT 
By enhancing the power of the Commander in Chief at the lowest 
ebb, Zivotofsky II emboldens the executive branch “to innovate and 
take risks” by ignoring legislation that interferes with national security 
objectives.181 This Part presents three case studies: covert-action 
notification requirements, electronic surveillance, and treatment of 
captured enemy combatants. Each shows that Zivotofsky II may have 
 
 174. Foreign Cables, supra note 171, at 27. 
 175. Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2084, 2086 (2015) (citations omitted). 
 176. See Jack Goldsmith, Zivotofsky’s Vindication (and the New York Times’ Approval) of 
Signing Statements, LAWFARE (June 9, 2015, 9:16 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/ 
zivotofskys-vindication-and-new-york-times-approval-signing-statements [http://perma.cc/7Q95-
ZKCM] (noting that editors of the New York Times had a negative view of the Bush 
administration’s practice of issuing signing statements). 
 177. See Curtis A. Bradley & Eric A. Posner, Presidential Signing Statements and Executive 
Power, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 307, 317–18 (2006) (cataloging the instances President Bush used 
signing statements to “raise[] constitutional concerns” about intrusion on executive power). 
 178. Statement on Signing the Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991, 27 WKLY. 
COMPILATION PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1137, 1137–38 (Aug. 14, 1991). 
 179. Statement on Signing the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 40 
WKLY. COMPILATION PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 2993, 2993–94 (Dec. 17, 2004). 
 180. Press Release, The White House, Statement by the President on H.R. 3304  
(Dec. 26, 2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/12/26/statement-president-hr-
3304 [http://perma.cc/A7YJ-7MTX]. 
 181. See JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON 
TERROR 186 (2006) (“In the war on terrorism, we will need officials at all levels, from career civil 
servants to cabinet members, to innovate and take risks.”). 
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concrete implications for executive power. Presidents have previously 
pushed the envelope in all of these areas before Zivotofsky II,182 often 
in secret183 and without convincing legal authority to support the 
actions.184  
A. Covert-Operation Notice Requirements 
1. The Legal Framework.  In November of 1986, the Beirut news 
magazine Al-Shiraa revealed that the Reagan administration had 
secretly (and probably illegally) sold arms to Iran through 
backchannels in Israel.185 Attorney General Edwin Meese announced 
that the weapons sale was part of an effort to obtain the release of 
American hostages held in Lebanon and that proceeds had been given 
to revolutionary Contras in communist Nicaragua.186 CIA General 
Counsel Stanley Sporkin assured the public that the administration had 
not acted unlawfully because the arms-for-hostages exchange fell 
within the President’s exclusive Commander-in-Chief prerogative to 
authorize covert actions.187  
 
 182. For further discussion, see supra note 170; infra notes 185–87, 202–05 and accompanying 
text.  
 183. For further discussion, see, e.g., supra note 169 and accompanying text; infra notes 186, 
220–21.  
 184. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Kathleen M. Sullivan, Laurence H. Tribe, David Cole & 
Curtis Bradley, On NSA Spying: A Letter to Congress, 53 N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Feb. 9, 2006), 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2006/02/09/on-nsa-spying-a-letter-to-congress [http://perma.cc/
6595-D4NA] (concluding that the DOJ failed to present any plausible legal grounds for certain 
surveillance actions during the Bush administration). 
 185. RICHARD S. CONLEY, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF THE U.S. PRESIDENCY, at xl (2015). 
 186. Iran-Contra Investigation (C-SPAN television broadcast Nov. 25, 1986); see also JOHN 
TOWER, EDMUND MUSKIE & BRENT SCOWCROFT, TOWER COMMISSION REPORT 1 (1987) 
(discussing how the affair raised “questions not only of policy and propriety but also violations of 
law”). During the period at issue, direct military aid to the Contras likely violated the Boland 
Amendment. See United States v. North, 708 F. Supp. 375, 377 n.1 (D.D.C. 1988) (assessing the 
scope of the Boland Amendment). Iran-Contra may have also violated the Arms Export Control 
Act (AECA), 22 U.S.C. §§ 2751–2780 (2006). The AECA generally required that “[n]o defense 
article or defense service,” shall be exported to a foreign country that “has repeatedly provided 
support for acts of international terrorism.” Id. §§ 2753, 2780(d). But see David J. Scheffer, U.S. 
Law and the Iran-Contra Affair, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 696, 698–713 (1987) (cataloging the exceptions 
to the AECA). 
 187. Sporkin claimed Congress had in fact recognized this constitutional authority in section 
501 of the 1980 Intelligence Oversight Act, which only applied “to the extent consistent with . . . 
the Constitution,” Pub. L. No. 96-450, 94 Stat. 1975 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 413(a) (1982)). See 
Joint Hearings Before the H. Select Comm. to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran and 
the S. Select Comm. on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition, 100th 
Cong. 194 (1987) (statement of Stanley Sporkin, Gen. Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency) 
(submitting that “section 501 specifically recognizes that . . . there are constitutional prerogatives 
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Congress rejected Sporkin’s argument. In 1991, the National 
Security Act was amended by placing additional restrictions on covert 
operations.188 The amendments also provided, for the first time,189 a 
legal definition of covert action: “an activity or activities of the United 
States Government to influence political, economic, or military 
conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United 
States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.”190 
Covert actions are politically satisfying because they “provide an 
intermediate option between the shortcomings of diplomacy and the 
excesses of military action.”191 But that convenience means that covert 
missions are susceptible to impulsive decisionmaking. These 
amendments passed in the wake of Iran-Contra affair endeavor to 
prevent covert-action misuse. 
2. How Zivotofsky II Weakens Covert-Action Limitations.  
Zivotofsky II strengthens two arguments for exclusive presidential 
authority over covert actions and, therefore, increases the chance that 
the executive branch will resort to unilateral action in the future. First, 
the Zivotofsky II Court clearly viewed the ability to act secretly as an 
attribute of presidential power that is necessary to meet constitutional 
 
which are not going to be dealt with by the notification” required by the Intelligence Oversight 
Act). Some of the drafters of section 501 appear to have agreed with this interpretation. See 126 
CONG. REC. 13,127 (June 3, 1980) (statement of Sen. Sam Nunn) (“[I]n certain instances the 
requirements of secrecy preclude any prior consultation with Congress.”); see also id. at 13,125 
(statement of Sen. Walter Huddleston) (“Section 501(b) recognizes that the President may assert 
constitutional authority to withhold prior notice of covert operations . . . .”). 
 188. See Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-88, § 503, 105 Stat. 
429, 442 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 3093 (2012)) (setting out limits on when the President 
may authorize covert actions, including five conditions that must be found in order to determine 
that the action is necessary). The new legal regime prohibits the President from authorizing a 
covert action unless a written finding was submitted to the Gang of Eight. See id. § 3093(c)(2) 
(referring to the “chairmen and ranking minority members of the congressional intelligence 
committees.”). A written finding cannot retroactively authorize a covert action. Id. § 3093(a)(2). 
The finding must specify “each department, agency, or entity of the United States” involved in 
the mission, including whether “any third party . . . will be used . . . in any significant way.” Id. 
§§ 3093(a)(3)–(4). The President also cannot authorize a mission that would violate the 
Constitution or federal law. Id. § 3093(a)(5). Nor can a covert action “be conducted which is 
intended to influence United States political processes, public opinion, policies, or media.” Id. 
§ 3093(f). 
 189. MARSHALL CURTIS ERWIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33715, COVERT ACTION: 
LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND AND POSSIBLE POLICY QUESTIONS 1 (2013). 
 190. 50 U.S.C. § 3093(e).  
 191. William S. Cohen, Congressional Oversight of Covert Actions: The Public’s Stake in the 
Forty-Eight Hour Rule, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 285, 293 (1989). 
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responsibilities.192 Recognition determinations are generally not urgent 
or necessary to protect the lives of Americans in danger. And yet 
Zivotofsky II decided that recognition needed to be an exclusive 
executive power, in part because only the President can collect 
“delicate and often secret” information and respond with “decisive, 
unequivocal action.”193 Those pragmatic arguments have equal (if not 
greater) force in the covert-mission context where the President orders 
armed service members into danger on the basis of classified 
intelligence, sometimes on short notice, and often to protect other 
American lives.194  There is also the possibility that congressional 
notification jeopardizes operational safety. As Charles Cooper, 
Assistant Attorney General in the Reagan administration, testified 
before the Senate in 1988, occasions arise when the President reaches 
the conclusion that adding more persons “into the charmed circle” is 
an unacceptable risk.195 In that case, secrecy is a tactical, battlefield 
decision that cannot constitutionally be limited by a notification statute 
(or so the argument goes).196 Zivotofsky II buttresses that contention. 
Second, the President may determine that mandatory disclosure 
will have a chilling effect “on the willingness of other countries to 
cooperate with the United States.”197 President Reagan’s Secretary of 
Defense Frank Carlucci, for example, believed that mandatory 
congressional notification would jeopardize the collection of 
 
 192. See Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2086 (2015) (“[O]nly the Executive has the 
characteristic of unity at all times. And with unity comes the ability to exercise, to a greater 
degree, ‘[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch.’” (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, supra note 
28, at 424 (alteration in original))); cf. Constitutionality of Proposed Statutory Provision 
Requiring Prior Congressional Notification for Certain CIA Covert Actions, 13 Op. O.L.C. 258, 
259 (1989) [hereinafter, CIA Covert Actions Opinion] (“[T]he President must be able to act 
secretly in order to meet his constitutional responsibilities in foreign affairs.”). 
 193. Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. at 2086. 
 194. See, e.g., Nicholas Schmidle, Getting Bin Laden: What Happened that Night in 
Abbottabad, NEW YORKER (Aug. 8, 2011), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/08/08/
getting-bin-laden [http://perma.cc/THY2-XC76] (describing the covert Bin Laden raid). 
 195. Oversight Legislation: Hearings Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 100th Cong. 
161 (1988) (statement of Charles Cooper, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United States) [hereinafter 
Oversight Legislation Hearings]. 
 196. For example, the DOJ has argued that Congress may not use its spending power to 
require that the President notify Congress of all covert missions that draw from the Reserve for 
Contingencies fund.  See CIA Covert Actions Opinion, supra note 192, at 261 (1989) 
(characterizing a statute requiring prior congressional notification of certain covert actions as 
tantamount to Congress using its spending power to take “tactical control of the armed forces”). 
 197. See Cohen, supra note 191, at 299 (noting that chilling effect is a “major executive branch 
concern,” though finding that any chilling effect caused by oversight is negligible and, in the long 
run, worth the risks). 
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intelligence.198 If our intelligence partners worldwide “perceive that the 
CIA has no control over the information” because “the agency is 
obliged to disgorge” its intelligence to Congress, he warned, “our 
intelligence assets will dry up.”199 
Zivotofsky II relies on a similar argument. Recognition, the Court 
reasoned, must be an exclusive presidential power because “[f]oreign 
countries need to know, before entering into diplomatic relations or 
commerce with the United States” that “their ambassadors will be 
received” and that “their officials will be immune from suit in federal 
court.”200 “These assurances cannot be equivocal.”201 Intelligence 
gathering requires similar assurances. Suppose the President decided 
to authorize covert military action dependent on sensitive information 
provided by a foreign country on the condition that the President 
would not disclose the covert operation to Congress. Although such an 
action would violate section 503 of the Intelligence Oversight Act, a 
court reviewing that action after the fact would probably be reluctant 
to find that the President acted unlawfully. Citing Zivotofsky II, 
executive branch lawyers would introduce historical-gloss and 
functionalist arguments as a basis to disregard covert-action disclosure 
requirements in the unique setting where lives, ally assurances, and 
operational success demand “secrecy” and “dispatch.” 
B. Electronic-Surveillance Limitations 
1. The Legal Framework.  In December 2005, the New York Times 
revealed that the Bush administration had issued a classified executive 
order authorizing the National Security Agency (NSA) to conduct 
warrantless electronic surveillance within the United States.202 
Electronic surveillance is the interception of “the contents of any wire 
or radio communication” sent or received by a person “who is in the 
United States.”203 In a press briefing two days after the news broke, 
 
 198. Oversight Legislation Hearings, supra note 195, at 198–99, 217–18 (statement of Frank 
Carlucci, Secretary of Defense of the United States). 
 199. Id. at 198–99. Secretary Carlucci added that intelligence assets had expressed reluctance 
to share sensitive information because “you people in the U.S. Government cannot keep a 
secret.” Id. at 217. 
 200. Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2086 (2015). 
 201. Id. 
 202. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1, A22 (citing an anonymous tip from “current and former officials” 
who were “concern[ed] about the operation’s legality and oversight”). 
 203. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f)(1) (2012) (emphasis added). 
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Attorney General Gonzales confirmed the secret order, but he 
explained that it only authorized the NSA to intercept “contents of 
communications” where the federal government has “a reasonable 
basis to conclude that one party to the communication is a member of 
al Qaeda.”204  
The DOJ defended this order by publishing a full-throated 
defense of the President’s independent authority to direct intelligence 
gathering in connection with hostilities against al Qaeda.205 But the 
DOJ’s white paper conceded that the President had authorized the 
NSA to conduct “warrantless electronic surveillance . . . at home” in 
the United States.206 And because the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act (FISA) requires the government to obtain a warrant before spying 
on Americans’ emails and phone calls,207 President Bush’s order was 
lawful only if his authority over wartime electronic surveillance was not 
only independent, but also exclusive.  
FISA generally requires the government to obtain a warrant from 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) before monitoring 
the electronic communications of a person within the United States.208 
FISA contains three limited exceptions,209 but the only exception 
relevant to President Bush’s surveillance order was a provision 
 
 204. Press Release, The White House, Press Briefing by Attorney General Alberto Gonzales 
and General Michael Hayden, Principal Deputy Director for National Intelligence (Dec. 19, 
2005), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/12/print/20051219-1.html 
[https://perma.cc/4XKT-SU7J] (describing the legal authorities supporting the President’s 
decision).  
 205. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National 
Security Agency Described by the President (Jan. 19, 2006) [hereinafter FISA Opinion]. 
 206. Id. at 2. 
 207. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 § 102, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a)(1)(B) (2012)) (allowing the President to conduct warrantless 
surveillance where “there is no substantial likelihood that the surveillance will acquire the 
contents of any communication to which a United States person is a party”). 
 208. See 50 U.S.C. § 1803 (designating federal judges to hear applications to authorize 
surveillance within the United States). 
 209. See id. § 1802(a)(1) (allowing the Attorney General to authorize warrantless electronic 
surveillance “for periods of up to one year if the Attorney General certifies in writing under oath 
that” the surveillance is directed at communications “used exclusively” between foreign powers 
or on “property or premises under the open and exclusive control of a foreign power”); id. 
§ 1805(e) (allowing the Attorney General to bypass warrant procedure if there are reasonable 
grounds that “an emergency situation exists” and a “factual basis for the issuance of an order” 
under FISA exists, and if a FISC judge is immediately notified afterwards); id. § 1811 (authorizing 
the President to “authorize electronic surveillance without a court order . . . for a period not to 
exceed fifteen calendar days following a declaration of war by the Congress”). 
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authorizing the President to order warrantless electronic surveillance 
for fifteen days during a war formally declared by Congress.210  
The DOJ argued211 that the declared-war exception was met by 
the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001 AUMF).212 
Congress passed the 2001 AUMF seven days after the September 11 
attacks to authorize President Bush to deploy military forces abroad.213 
The DOJ interpreted the 2001 AUMF as implicitly granting the 
President authority to monitor, without a warrant, the content of email 
and phone conversations of persons within the United States for over 
two years.214 That reading is difficult to reconcile with provisions in 
FISA that make the President’s authority to order warrantless 
surveillance incumbent on a declaration of war from Congress,215 which 
is a more formal authorization than the 2001 AUMF. And even then, 
the President’s authority is limited to the first fifteen days of 
hostilities.216 
The DOJ also cited In re Sealed Case217 to suggest that the 
President has exclusive authority to conduct warrantless electronic 
surveillance during wartime.218 That case, the first appeal from FISC to 
the FISA “Court of Review,”219 addressed whether FISC could require 
that the intelligence obtained by its approval order not be used for 
criminal prosecutions.220 The review court concluded that such 
conditions were not mandated by either the plain text of FISA or the 
Constitution.221 The court also acknowledged that other federal courts 
generally had found that the President possessed “inherent” authority 
 
 210. Id. § 1811. 
 211. FISA Opinion, supra note 205, at 25–26. 
 212. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
 213. Id. § 2(a). 
 214. FISA Opinion, supra note 205, at 2–3. 
 215. 50 U.S.C. § 1811. 
 216. Id.; see also Dworkin et al., supra note 184 (reasoning that “the AUMF cannot 
reasonably be construed to implicitly authorize warrantless electronic surveillance in the United 
States during wartime, where Congress has expressly and specifically addressed that precise 
question in FISA and limited any such warrantless surveillance to the first fifteen days of war”). 
 217. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002). 
 218. FISA Opinion, supra note 205, at 31. 
 219. Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 719; see also 50 U.S.C. § 1803(b) (2012) (establishing appellate 
review of FISC decisions). 
 220. See Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 720–22 (characterizing the FISA order as constructing a 
“wall” between “intelligence officials and law enforcement officers”). 
 221. Id. at 720. 
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to order warrantless intelligence gathering.222 But these decisions 
characterized presidential authority as independent, not exclusive; and 
in any event were issued before FISA was enacted.223 Indeed, Sealed 
Case itself expressly determined that FISA’s statutory restrictions on 
electronic surveillance were proper limits on presidential power.224 
2. How Zivotofsky II Affects the Law of Surveillance.  The DOJ’s 
white paper also emphasized the executive branch’s “structural 
advantages” to support its broad reading of the 2001 AUMF.225 In 
particular, the DOJ argued that the President’s inherent authority to 
conduct intelligence gathering could not be subject to certain statutory 
restrictions because only the executive has the requisite “expertise,”226 
largely facilitated by “his confidential sources . . . in the form of 
diplomatic, consular and other officials.”227 Such arguments are 
strengthened by Zivotofsky II. Like the recognition power, foreign-
intelligence collection does not clearly fall within the text of the 
President’s responsibilities enumerated in Article II,228 nor within any 
 
 222. Id. at 742 (noting that other courts have uniformly decided “that the President d[oes] 
have inherent authority to conduct warrantless searches to obtain foreign intelligence 
information”). 
 223. Id. (explaining that all “courts to have decided the issue” “dealt with a pre-FISA 
surveillance”); see also ELIZABETH B. BAZAN & JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
MEMORANDUM: PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT WARRANTLESS ELECTRONIC 
SURVEILLANCE TO GATHER FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION 31 (Jan. 5, 2006) 
(concluding that the precedent Sealed Case references for the President’s authority over 
intelligence “appears to have been . . . cases which pre-date FISA’s passage or which address pre-
FISA surveillances”). 
 224. Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 742. 
 225. FISA Opinion, supra note 205, at 7. 
 226. Id. at 9. 
 227. Id. at 7 (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936)). 
 228. The extent to which the Commander-in-Chief Clause contains an exclusive power over 
intelligence collection is debated. Compare David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The 
Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb: A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941, 951, 
1059, 1075 (2008) (contending that “constitutional practice between 1789 and the Civil War 
suggests” the Commander in Chief’s role in intelligence collection is “ultimate[ly] subject[t] to 
statutory control”), with John Yoo, The Legality of the National Security Agency’s Bulk Data 
Surveillance Programs, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 901, 903 (2014) (arguing that the 
Commander-in-Chief power necessarily includes “the ability to engage in electronic surveillance 
that gathers intelligence on the enemy”). Some have argued that Article II’s Vesting Clause 
contains an unenumerated, residual foreign affairs power that includes the power to dispatch spies 
overseas. See Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign 
Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 288 (2001) (“[W]hen James Iredell spoke of the President sending a 
spy overseas, he assumed that the executive’s power over foreign affairs would authorize the 
executive’s control of such agents.” (footnote omitted)).  
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of Congress’s powers enumerated in Article I.229 Historical sources 
indicate that the Framers understood intelligence gathering as an 
independent prerogative of the Commander in Chief, subject to 
congressional control through the spending power.230 That textual 
ambiguity makes warrantless wiretapping an especially rich example of 
how the functionalist approach in Zivotofsky II can enhance executive 
powers. 
Zivotofsky II means that administration lawyers no longer need to 
rely on “shards of judicial dicta” to argue that the comparative 
advantages of the presidency inform the reach of executive powers.231 
Zivotofsky II asserts the functionalist arguments that the DOJ raised 
in defense of President Bush’s warrantless wiretapping program. And 
where the DOJ heavily cited Curtiss-Wright, they can now cite 
Zivotofsky II for a case that, unlike Curtiss-Wright, actually invalidated 
an act of Congress.  
C. Extraordinary Rendition and the Exchange of Prisoners 
1. The Legal Framework.  Rendition is the “return of a fugitive 
from one state to the state where the fugitive is accused or was 
convicted of a crime.”232 Extraordinary rendition is the extrajudicial 
transfer of an individual “for the purpose of arrest, detention, [or] 
 
 229. The Commerce Clause is the most likely candidate for an enumerated congressional 
power to regulate electronic surveillance. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3; Gary Lawson, What 
Lurks Beneath: NSA Surveillance and Executive Power, 88 B.U. L. REV. 375, 392 n.112 (2008) 
(“Modern doctrine . . . would find authorization for FISA in the Commerce Clause.”); see also 
Victor M. Hansen & Lawrence Friedman, The Value of the Military Commissions Act as 
Nonjudicial Precedent in the Context of Litigation over National Security Policymaking, 53 S. TEX. 
L. REV. 1, 20 (2011) (describing “domestic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes” as “an 
area of overlap between the executive and legislative branches”). 
 230. Compare 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION 
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT 
PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 113 (John Elliot ed., William S. Hein & Co. 2d ed. 1996) (1891) 
(statement of James Iredell) (observing that the Constitution enabled the President to order a spy 
to “go over to the enemy” to obtain “secret information”), with Act of 1 July 1790, 1 Stat. 128–
129 (1790) (requiring President Washington to provide an accounting of intelligence 
expenditures).  The President’s independent power over matters of espionage accords with 
practice during the War for Independence. The Committee of Secret Correspondence gathered 
intelligence for the Continental Congress, see 3 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 
1774–1789, at 392 (1905), while General Washington primarily relied on his own spies, see 
ALEXANDER ROSE, WASHINGTON’S SPIES: THE STORY OF AMERICA’S FIRST SPY RING 67–75 
(2006). 
 231. Goldsmith, supra note 25, at 114. 
 232. Rendition, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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interrogation by the receiving State.”233 President Clinton was the first 
to use rendition principles as part of an offensive against international 
terrorism. Presidential Decision Directive 39, signed on June 21, 1995, 
vested in the Secretary of State pertinent authority to “use all legal 
means available to exclude from the United States persons who pose a 
terrorist threat and deport or otherwise remove from the United States 
any such aliens.”234 Some question whether President Clinton had the 
constitutional authority to uproot individuals suspected of terrorism 
and deliver them to foreign countries “where they were wanted for 
their crimes.”235  During a candid meeting with President Clinton, Vice 
President Al Gore admitted that extraordinary rendition is “[o]f course 
. . . a violation of international law, that’s why it’s a covert action. The 
guy is a terrorist. Go grab his ass.”236 
Extraordinary rendition multiplied after the attacks of September 
11. In a confidential opinion, OLC gave the CIA the go-ahead to 
transfer Iraqi citizens and other detainees out of Iraq to be interrogated 
for a “brief but not indefinite period.”237 By 2004, reports began to 
surface that the CIA had created a phony corporation—assigned the 
Orwellian name “Premier Executive Transport Services”—for the 
purpose of “whisk[ing]” away hooded and handcuffed prisoners to 
countries that do not mind performing the “dirty work” of enhanced 
interrogations.238  
After the CIA’s extraordinary rendition policy became public, 
Attorney General Alberto Gonzales assured the public that if 
renditions were made to countries with a history of torture, the Bush 
 
 233. MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32890, RENDITIONS: 
CONSTRAINTS IMPOSED BY LAWS ON TORTURE 1 (2009).  
 234. Presidential Decision Directive 39: U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism (June 21, 1995), 
http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd39.htm [https://perma.cc/R4NS-HA7A]. 
 235. See Louis Fisher, Extraordinary Rendition: The Price of Secrecy, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1405, 
1409 (2008) (“[S]ome of the two dozen suspects were brought to the United States to stand trial, 
but ‘most were delivered to other countries where they were wanted for their crimes.’ Does 
‘wanted for crimes’ mean being turned over to the judicial system, or, instead, for interrogation 
and torture?”). 
 236. RICHARD CLARKE, AGAINST ALL ENEMIES: INSIDE AMERICA’S WAR ON TERROR 143–
44 (2004). 
 237. Dana Priest, Memo Lets CIA Take Detainees out of Iraq, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2004, at 
A1. 
 238. See Dana Priest, Jet Is an Open Secret in Terror War, WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 2004, at A1 
(reporting on the actions of the CIA and the “Premier Executive Transport Services”). Egyptian 
interrogators were known to beat victims “with fists, whips, metal rods, or other objects,” subject 
them “to electrical shocks,” and douse them with cold water. 2 DEP’T OF STATE, COUNTRY 
REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2003, at 1826–27 (2004). 
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administration would obtain “assurances” that torture would not be 
used.239 Put delicately, these assurances were aspirational, since the 
administration “can’t fully control what other nations do.”240 Put 
indelicately, as one CIA officer who helped orchestrate renditions 
stated, such assurances were a “farce.”241 
Extraordinary rendition was undertaken without authorization 
from Congress and arguably in violation of several restrictions that 
Congress has placed on the President’s authority. One source of legal 
restrictions was the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment242 (Torture 
Convention), approved by the Senate in 1994. 243  To be sure, most 
provisions of the Torture Convention are not self-executing,244 and so 
it cannot be invoked in court by persons subject to extradition orders.245 
But Congress has passed implementing legislation. For example, 18 
U.S.C. § 2340A criminalizes actions—and more importantly 
conspiracies—by public officials to sanction acts of torture outside of 
the United States when acting under the color of law.246 Congress has 
also implemented the Torture Convention by declaring (as a matter of 
policy) that the United States will not “effect the involuntary return” 
of any person to a country where there are substantial grounds to 
believe that they will be tortured, “regardless of whether the person is 
physically present in the United States.”247  
 
 239. R. Jeffrey Smith, Gonzales Defends Transfer of Detainees, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 2005, at 
A3. 
 240. Id. (citations omitted).  
 241. Dana Priest, CIA Assurances on Transferred Suspects Doubted, WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 
2005, at A1. 
 242. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Torture 
Convention]. 
 243. See 136 CONG. REC. 36,198–99 (1990) (giving consent, subject to certain reservations, to 
the Torture Convention). 
 244. See S. EXEC. REP. NO. 30-101 (1990) (declaring “Articles 1 through 16 of the [Torture] 
Convention are not self-executing”). Absent this declaration, some argue that Article 3 of the 
Convention, prohibiting parties from extraditing individuals to countries where they will be 
tortured, would provide an enforceable cause of action. See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Four 
Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 695, 706–07, n.55 (1995) (arguing that 
Article 3 of the Torture Convention would “undoubtedly be enforceable by courts entertaining 
habeas corpus petitions of persons subject to extradition orders”). 
 245. See, e.g., Pierre v. Gonzales, 502 F.3d 109, 114 (2d Cir. 2007) (“The [Torture Convention] 
is not self-executing; by its own force, it confers no judicially enforceable right on individuals.”). 
 246. See H.R. REP. NO. 103-482, at 229 (1994) (Conf. Rep.) (noting that 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340, 
2340A (2012) implement the Torture Convention). 
 247. 18 U.S.C § 2340A(a)–(c) (2012); see also id. § 2340 (defining “torture”). 
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Finally, though enacted after OLC’s opinion greenlighting 
extraordinary rendition, the 2006 Military Commissions Act also 
establishes that the torture (or conspiracy to commit torture) of 
unlawful enemy combatants is a federal war crime.248 Accordingly, the 
Congressional Research Service and other commentators believe that 
using extraordinary rendition to obtain intelligence through torture is 
illegal.249 To be sure, prosecuting military officers or intelligence 
officials for violating these laws would be difficult, if not impossible in 
some cases. But Congress does not need to impose criminal liability to 
bring the President’s power to the lowest ebb; it is sufficient if the 
President’s action contravenes “the implied will of Congress.”250  
2. The Significance of Zivotofsky II for Extraordinary Rendition 
Law.  President Bush’s independent authority to order renditions of 
captured enemy combatants has been defended as a substantive 
component of the Commander-in-Chief power. The leading advocate 
of this position, Professor John Yoo, contends that “the President and 
military commanders historically have transferred captured enemy 
combatants to allies.”251 Historical practice tends to support an 
executive power over captured enemies. And as with recognition, 
Congress’s authority to dictate the treatment of prisoners captured on 
the field of battle is uncertain.252 That ambiguous constitutional 
 
 248. Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub. L. 
No. 105-277, § 2242(a), 112 Stat. 2681, 2681–822 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231). 
 249. Id. § 2241(d)(1)(A). President Bush noted in a signing statement that the CIA would 
“continue its program for questioning key terrorist leaders and operatives.” Remarks on Signing 
the Military Commissions Act of 2006, 42 WKLY. COMPILATION PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 
1832 (Oct. 17, 2006). 
 250. See, e.g., GARCIA, supra note 233, at 12 (“Clearly, it would violate U.S. criminal law and 
[Torture Convention] obligations for a U.S. official to conspire to commit torture via rendition, 
regardless of where such renditions would occur.”); Fisher, supra note 235, at 1416 (arguing that 
extraordinary rendition falls outside rule of law norms). 
 251. John Yoo, Transferring Terrorists, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1183, 1235 (2004); see also 
id. at 1204–21 (collecting examples). 
 252. The main candidate for congressional authority is the Captures Clause, which grants to 
Congress the power to “make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water.” U.S. CONST. art. 
1, § 8, cl. 11. But this clause has always been understood as referring only to captured enemy 
property. The word “Capture” bore a specific connotation in international law as “[t]he taking of 
property by one belligerent from another or from an offending neutral.” Capture, 1 BOUVIER’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 422 (Francis Rawle ed., 3d rev. ed. 1914) (1839). And the Framers certainly 
understood that meaning because the precursor to the Captures Clause in the Articles of 
Confederation empowered the Continental Congress to “establish[] rules for deciding, in all 
cases, what captures on land or water shall be legal, and in what manner prizes taken by land or 
naval forces in the service of the United States, shall be divided or appropriated.” ARTICLES OF 
CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IX, § 1. This reading is buttressed by Justice Story’s well-regarded 
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footing, along with the President’s historic authority over captured 
enemies, makes the topic of extraordinary rendition ripe for the 
analytic approach of Zivotofsky II.  
Zivotofsky II will enhance executive branch assertions of an 
exclusive power to make decisions regarding torture and the treatment 
of captured enemy combatants in three ways. First, the President is 
more capable than a plural Congress “to take the decisive, unequivocal 
action necessary”253 to make decisions regarding captured enemy 
combatants because their treatment has reciprocal implications for the 
treatment of American soldiers.254 Second, the President’s undisputed 
intelligence advantage means that the executive branch alone should 
negotiate agreements with foreign actors to interrogate high-value 
suspects.255 Third, foreign countries will need unequivocal assurances 
from the President that America has the resolve to extract the 
information by torture before they relinquish high-value suspects. 
Those assurances require the President to have the option of rendering 
the prisoner to less squeamish partners in the War on Terror. 
Indeed, the arguments in Zivotofsky II are strikingly similar to 
those proffered by the torture memos.256 These memos, authored by 
Yoo while at OLC, infamously argued that battlefield interrogation 
standards were a core function of the Commander-in-Chief power 
because they serve vital military objectives, such as obtaining 
intelligence.257 He further argued that the President’s control over 
interrogation standards was not only inherent, but also exclusive 
because of “the functional consideration that national security 
 
treatise on the Constitution, in which he explains that the Captures Clause empowers Congress 
only to “authorize the seizure and condemnation of the property of the enemy within, or without 
the territory of the United States.” STORY, supra note 121, § 1172, at 64. 
 253. Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2079 (2015). 
 254. See Yoo, supra note 251, at 1220–21 (explaining that America’s treatment of captured 
members of the North Vietnamese Army “strictly adhered” to the Geneva Convention so as to 
ensure captured servicemen would be similarly treated). 
 255. See id. at 1200 (arguing that the “disposition of individuals captured during military 
operations requires command-type decisions” and requires “the gathering of intelligence,” which 
is “the essence of executive action”). 
 256. DUKE U. SCH. OF L., Ilya Shapiro & Ernest A. Young: Supreme Court Roundup, 
YOUTUBE (Oct. 21, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zww5dPLxzMA [https://perma.
cc/V2XM-S2DE] (suggesting that Zivotofsky II makes “the same argument” that “John Yoo 
infamously adopted in the Torture Memos during the Bush Administration”). 
 257. Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, 
to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def., Military Interrogation of Alien Unlawful 
Combatants Held Outside the United States 10 (Mar. 14, 2003), https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/
safefree/yoo_army_torture_memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/X3E5-JBBL].  
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decisions require a unity in purpose and energy that characterizes the 
Presidency alone.”258 Yoo concluded that Congress can no more 
intrude on the President’s decision regarding the interrogation of 
enemy combatants than it could dictate tactical decisions on the 
ground.259 That analysis, now adopted by an opinion of the Supreme 
Court, could embolden the executive to bend—if not break—federal 
statutes. 
The Bergdahl prisoner exchange in 2014 is a useful example. 
Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl was captured by the Taliban in 2009 and was 
released in May 2014 in exchange for the release of five high-ranking 
members of the Taliban government from the Guantanamo Bay 
detention center.260 The Obama administration executed the prisoner 
swap without notifying Congress.261 After news of the exchange 
became public, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
concluded that the Bergdahl exchange violated section 1035 of the 
2014 National Defense Authorization Act (2014 NDAA) and 
section 8111 of the 2014 Department of Defense Appropriations 
Act.262  
Zivotofsky II casts doubt on the GAO’s assessment. Indeed, when 
President Obama signed the 2014 NDAA, he stated that section 1035 
was an unconstitutional violation of “separation of powers principles” 
because it hampered the executive’s ability to “act swiftly in conducting 
negotiations with foreign countries regarding the circumstances of 
detainee transfers.”263 Whether the President had the authority to 
transfer five Taliban operatives out of Guantanamo in exchange for 
Bergdahl remains uncertain. But it is in such cases—the close calls—
where Zivotofsky II is most helpful to the executive branch, because 
 
 258. Id. at 5. 
 259. Id. at 19. 
 260. Michael Ames, Untangling the Mysteries Behind Bowe Bergdahl’s Rescue Mission, 
NEWSWEEK (Apr. 9, 2015, 5:56 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/2015/04/17/untangling-
mysteries-behind-bowe-bergdahls-rescue-mission-320891.html [http://perma.cc/XD2W-APXN]. 
 261. See Mitch McConnell, Republican Leader, United States Senate, B-326013, 2014 WL 
4100408 (Comp. Gen. Aug. 21, 2014), http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665390.pdf [http://perma.cc/
H4NU-TK8P] (concluding that the Department of Defense violated the Department of Defense 
Appropriations Act, 2014 when it transferred several Guantanamo Bay detainees without 
“notify[ing] the relevant congressional committees at least 30 days in advance of the transfer”). 
 262. Id. at 7. 
 263. Press Release, The White House, Statement by the President on H.R. 3304  
(Dec. 26, 2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/12/26/statement-president-hr-
3304 [http://perma.cc/A7YJ-7MTX].  
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functionalist considerations are now an additional justification for 
construing a traditional presidential power as an exclusive one. 
*        *        * 
Zivotofsky II is readily adaptable to recurrent flashpoints between 
the executive and legislative branches in matters of national security. 
Administration lawyers, who already have a predilection to interpret 
presidential power expansively, will cite Zivotofsky II for the 
proposition that functionalist arguments inform the reach of 
presidential power at the lowest ebb. For instance, the executive 
branch can now cite Zivotofsky II to support the proposition that 
covert-operation notification laws unconstitutionally intrude on the 
Commander-in-Chief power when the President determines that 
nondisclosure is key to operational success. The decision’s emphasis on 
executive branch intelligence gathering also appears to weaken FISA’s 
prohibition on warrantless wiretapping. And because the decision 
deploys the same functionalist arguments used in the torture memos, 
laws designed to prevent the President from outsourcing the torture of 
unlawful enemy combatants are on uncertain footing. In short, federal 
statutes that restrain the unilateral use of presidential war powers are 
now more susceptible to disregard.  
IV. OBJECTIONS 
A. An Inexplicable Outlier 
To some, Zivotofsky II may simply be a one-day-ticket decision.264 
Cognizant that the status of Jerusalem is a “delicate subject,” perhaps 
the Court was simply loathe to force the President to reverse a decades-
long policy of neutrality.265 Under this view, Zivotofsky II is an outlier 
that does not signal a shift in doctrine.  
That position is too optimistic. Collapsing Zivotofsky II into a 
results-driven one-off fails to explain the opinion’s breadth. If the 
Court sought only to ensure that the President could remain neutral on 
the “delicate subject” of sovereign control over Jerusalem,266 it could 
 
 264. See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 669 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (“The reason 
for my concern is that the instant decision, overruling that announced about nine years ago, tends 
to bring adjudications of this tribunal into the same class as a restricted railroad ticket, good for 
this day and train only.”). 
 265. See Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2094 (2015) (discussing how the law would require the 
President to reverse long-standing, calculated policy).  
 266. Id. at 2081.  
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have done so on narrower and more familiar grounds. To begin with, 
it is not at all clear that Congress can, under the guise of regulating 
passports, pronounce determinations about the boundaries of a 
sovereign nation.267 And if section 214(d) does not rest on one of 
Congress’s enumerated powers, then the Court could have skipped the 
exclusivity question and instead invalidated the statute without 
invoking a functionalist approach to measure the President’s power vis-
à-vis Congress in foreign affairs. 
More importantly, even if the majority opinion was 
“gerrymandered to the facts” of the case,268 executive branch lawyers 
will adopt the functionalist approach of Zivotofsky II when advising 
the President on countless other matters, just as they did with Curtiss-
Wright.269  
B. A Win for Congress  
A number of scholars contend that Zivotofsky II is a Pyrrhic 
victory for the executive branch. That is primarily because the 
Zivotofsky II Court repudiated Curtiss-Wright’s dicta that the 
President is the sole actor responsible for the nation’s foreign policy.270 
Ostensibly, Zivotofsky II does winnow the Curtiss-Wright wheat from 
the chaff. Justice Kennedy noted that “Curtiss-Wright did not hold that 
the President is free from Congress’ lawmaking power in the field of 
international relations” because “it is Congress that makes laws,” and 
“it is essential the congressional role in foreign affairs be understood 
 
 267. Justice Thomas’s opinion took this tack. See id. at 2103–07 (Thomas, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (concluding that Congress lacked such a power). In his view, the 
President’s independent recognition power was retained in the “residual foreign affairs power” 
granted by Article II’s Vesting Clause. Id. at 2096–97. There is substantial evidence that his view 
accords with the Founding-era’s understanding of the “executive power.” See Prakash & Ramsey, 
supra note 228, at 252–65, 311–14 (collecting sources). And because Justice Thomas maintained 
that Congress lacked authority “to require the President to list Israel as the place of birth for a 
citizen born in Jerusalem on that citizen’s passport,” he joined the Court in holding section 214(d) 
unconstitutional—at least as applied to passports—without declaring Congress powerless over all 
matters of recognition. Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. at 2101 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  
 268. Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. at 2121 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 269. See, e.g., Destroyers Opinion, supra note 20, at 486–87 (“[The President], not Congress, 
has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign countries, and 
especially is this true in time of war.” (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 
U.S. 304, 319 (1934))). For further discussion, see also supra note 22 and accompanying text.  
 270. Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. at 2089–90. 
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and respected.”271 Accordingly, some argue that the mitigation of 
Curtiss-Wright will cost the executive more than was gained by 
prevailing over a novel passport statute.272 Indeed, Professor Michael 
Dorf suggests that, although Zivotofsky II struck down an act of 
Congress, the decision may principally be remembered for “vindicating 
congressional power over foreign affairs.”273  
These arguments seem ill founded. Zivotofsky II may be the first 
time that the Court has ever distanced itself from the sweeping 
language of Curtiss-Wright,274 but Zivotofsky II also invigorates 
Curtiss-Wright by heavily relying on the institutional advantages of the 
executive branch.275 For example, the Court insisted that recognition 
decisions must be made “with one voice.”276 The President must be that 
voice because, unlike Congress, “only the Executive has the 
characteristic of unity at all times. And with unity comes the ability to 
exercise . . . ‘decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch.’”277 That 
argument is a blatant Curtiss-Wright-ism. And now executive branch 
lawyers do not need to cite the discredited Curtiss-Wright decision: “In 
many contexts, OLC can switch citations from Curtiss-Wright to 
Zivotofsky II.”278  
Indeed, far from diminishing Curtiss-Wright, Zivotofsky II 
fortifies its conclusion that the institutional advantages of the 
presidency are a valid basis for exclusive executive power. That is 
because the discussion of functional considerations in Curtiss-Wright 
arose not in the context of whether the President could defy Congress, 
but in the context of whether Congress had provided the President with 
too much power.279 Curtiss-Wright was an unlawful-legislative-
 
 271. See id. at 2090 (finding that Curtiss-Wright’s “description of the President’s exclusive 
power was not necessary to the holding”). 
 272. Dorf, supra note 31. 
 273. Id. 
 274. See Charles Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An Historical 
Reassessment, 83 YALE L.J. 1, 5 (1973) (“On several occasions the Court has rejected broad 
interpretations of the foreign relations power; it has nevertheless avoided directly attacking 
Curtiss-Wright.”). 
 275. Goldsmith, supra note 25, at 128–30. 
 276. Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. at 2086 (quoting Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 424 
(2003)). 
 277. Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, supra note 28, at 424). 
 278. Goldsmith, supra note 25, at 142 n.188. 
 279. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315 (1936) (“The 
determination which we are called to make . . . is whether the Joint Resolution, as applied to 
[foreign affairs], is vulnerable to attack under the rule that forbids a delegation of the lawmaking 
power.”). 
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delegation case.280 The Court was determining whether Congress, not 
the President, had exceeded the bounds of its authority. The unique 
capabilities of the executive branch are somewhat relevant in a case 
like Curtiss-Wright because Congress may have given power to the 
executive branch to take advantage of the unity and energy of the 
presidency. But in cases where the President claims authority to 
displace federal law, invoking the structural advantage of the executive 
branch against Congress makes Zivotofsky II, if anything, a stronger 
endorsement of functionalist arguments than Curtiss-Wright. 
Professor Michael Glennon defends the “Pro-Congress” view on 
different grounds. He notes that after Zivotofsky II shovels dirt onto 
Curtiss-Wright’s “unbounded” vision of presidential power,281 the 
Court favorably cites Little for the proposition that the executive is not 
insulated from the “controls and checks” of Congress just because 
foreign affairs are in play.282 Glennon argues that because Zivotofsky 
II elevates Little above Curtiss-Wright, the Court delivered “a [b]low” 
to executive authority.283 Glennon concludes that “nothing in 
Zivotofsky makes a presidential victory [in separation-of-powers 
disputes] more likely.”284 
The favorable juxtaposition of Little against Curtiss-Wright is 
important, but Glennon carries his conclusion too far. After all, Little 
rejected the functionalist reading of the Non-Intercourse Act offered 
by the executive branch.285 Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion 
acknowledged both that America was engaged in hostilities with 
France and that the President’s interpretation of the Act as reaching 
ships bound “to or from” France would be more “effect[ive]” at 
discouraging illicit trade.286 Yet, the Court held that President Adams 
lacked the power to go beyond the authority Congress had delegated.287 
Zivotofsky II shows no such restraint. The same type of argument that 
President Adams used as a shield to defend his enforcement of a 
federal law, the Zivotofsky II Court wielded as a sword to invalidate a 
federal law outright. 
 
 280. Id. 
 281. Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. at 2089. 
 282. Id. at 2090. 
 283. Glennon, supra note 31. 
 284. Id. 
 285. See Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 178 (1804) (noting that the “construction 
from the executive of the United States . . . [was] much better calculated to give [the Act] effect”). 
 286. Id. 
 287. Id. at 177–78. 
HARRINGTON IN PRINTER FINAL - REVISED (DO NOT DELETE) 12/1/2018  9:18 AM 
2017] DECISIONMAKING AT THE LOWEST EBB 1643 
CONCLUSION 
During the final stages of World War I, statesman (and future 
Chief Justice) Charles Evans Hughes declared that “we have a fighting 
constitution”: a Constitution animated not by atextual pragmatism but 
by “new applications of unchanged powers.”288 The exigencies of 
World War I—the first war fought with tanks, poison gas, and 
submarines—did not justify “put[ting] the constitution aside as having 
no relation to these times.”289  
That is why Zivotofsky II’s novel emphasis on functionalism is 
significant. If institutional competencies were a valid consideration 
when resolving disputes between the political branches, much of our 
constitutional history might look different. President Truman could 
have seized the steel mills to protect the American forces in Korea 
from supply shock.290 President Reagan could have lawfully sold TOW 
antitank missiles to Iran because only he possessed “the delicate and 
often secret” intelligence to liberate American hostages and support 
anticommunist fighters in Nicaragua.291 In almost every instance of 
presidential initiative receding to the judgment of Congress, an 
institutional advantage of the executive was blunted. 
Zivotofsky II, then, is not just a case about passports. “The 
accretion of dangerous power,” Justice Frankfurter warned in 
Youngstown, “does not come in a day,” but over time from “unchecked 
disregard of the restrictions that fence in even the most disinterested 
assertion of authority.”292 Unremarkable claims of power can reshape 
the separation-of-powers landscape if, by sustaining them, the Court 
reorients the scope and source of executive power. Zivotofsky II is such 
a decision. By pronouncing historical practice and executive 
competencies to be an important part of the lowest-ebb analysis, courts 
and administration lawyers will permit and advocate for bolder 
assertions of executive authority. That influence will primarily be felt 
 
 288. Charles E. Hughes, War Powers and the Constitution, 2 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 18 (1917) 
(emphasis added). 
 289. Id. at 8. 
 290. See Brief for Petitioner at 98, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 
(1952) (No. 745), reprinted in 48 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE UNITED STATES 702–05 (1975) (contending that the Constitution’s “living and flexible 
meaning” gave the President “ample power to supply an army” and that Truman’s seizure of the 
steel mills was necessary to secure “the safety and effectiveness” of the American troops in Korea 
(citation omitted)). 
 291. Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2086 (2015). 
 292. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 594 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
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in the national security context where values like “decision, secrecy, 
and dispatch” have unmitigated force.  
